12 July 2010. A World to Win News Service. The top U.S. commander in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal has been removed from his position and replaced by Gen. David Petraeus, his superior as the officer in charge of all U.S. forces in the greater Middle East. In an interview with a Rolling Stone magazine reporter who spent a month with the general in Europe and at his Afghanistan headquarters, McChrystal had criticised and even ridiculed his civilian leadership, including President Barack Obama, Vice President Joe Biden, National Security Adviser Gen. James L. Jones, Richard C. Holbrooke, the administration’s special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Karl W. Eikenberry, the U.S. ambassador.
The general's insubordination and his subsequent firing came after another remarkable incident, a public exchange of bitter criticisms between the Obama administration and officials of the Hamid Karzai government in Afghanistan.
These open challenges to the U.S. government are hints of a festering crisis that the Afghanistan war has created for the U.S. and the Nato alliance it leads in this occupation. The problem seems all the more serious for these imperialists in that this dismissal represents something more than a reaction to some unwelcome public disparagement.
What previously seemed to be a quick and easy war for the U.S. and other Western imperialists has turned out differently. After a decade, it is only getting harder for them. Casualty levels for the occupation troops are approaching the level of the Iraq war at its height. The U.S. alone has spent more than 200 billion dollars on the war, mainly on military aspects. There are about 130,00 occupation troops, not counting the private mercenaries, and more American soldiers are on the way.
Increasing the number of forces and military spending on this war has only led to a deteriorating military and political situation for the imperialists and dragged them deeper into a war with no end in sight.
In fact, the way General McChrystal treated some of the political leaders and the way they reacted reveals something about both the growing frustration and impatience among the imperialists and the real policy differences about how to deal with the war that are beginning to break out in their once united ranks.
These differences include how to deal with the "insurgents" , or in other words, whether or not to negotiate with the Taliban in view of some sort of power-sharing arrangement. There has also been the disagreement about whether or not to increase the number of occupation troops that flared up when McChrystal demanded 40,000 more soldiers in June 2009, a month after he was assigned to run the war. This seems to be an attempt to build up a stronger position from which to negotiate.
The irony is that Hamid Karzai, his brother Ahmad Vali Karzai and his government have been the bluntest defenders of General McChrystal. They did all they could to keep the U.S. administration from sacking him. This shows the entanglement of the two above-mentioned issues with a third: how to deal with the regime that the U.S. and its allies themselves installed, and with the head of government they themselves designated, Hamid Karzai.
Karzai and the nature of his insubordination to the U.S.
We have read and heard much in the last couple of years about the corruption that has taken over Afghanistan, to the point that its government is considered one of the most corrupt on the planet, and Karzai's unwillingness and inability to clean house. Even some American media have clearly exposed the involvement of the president's brother and other present and former cabinet members and high-ranking officials in drug trafficking. The content of this exposure is not that the government, from top to bottom, is literally on the imperialist payroll, but that its members are more interested in drug dealing, bribes and other means of amassing personal fortunes stashed away in foreign banks than in acting for the "greater good" of their employers' goals.
Let’s briefly review the conflict between Karzai and the U.S. that escalated when Obama took office and heightened even more when Karzai came up for re-election in August 2009.
Many U.S. and British officials had already accused him of a lack of will in fighting corruption. For this reason there were rumours that the U.S. and other Western imperialists might not support him for a second term in office. However, in the end, they seemed to come to the conclusion that due to the complexity of the political situation, such a change might create even more problems for them. For instance, there was consideration of replacing him with his rival Abdullah Abdullah, a former Foreign Minister under Karzai. But bringing in this Tajik member of the Northern Alliance of warlords who were the U.S.'s main allies in their original invasion would create more problems among different factions supporting the occupation now, including the reactionary Pashtun warlords.
In sum, there was no alternative to Karzai at that point. Besides, Karzai himself felt it was not the time for him to leave. Maybe he thought his service to the imperialists was worth more than he had been paid.
So in the end they had to support him for another term. However, the Obama government put conditions on this. Obama said, "As I indicated to him [Karzai]… the proof is not going to be in words; it's going to be in deeds." (The New York Times, 3 November 2009). His Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that the Afghanistan president "could do better", told him to set up an "anti-corruption commission" and warned him that otherwise the U.S. could cut off civilian "aid". When Karzai complied and set up the commission to work with the FBI and the UK and European Union police, U.S. ambassador Eikenberry thundered that this was not enough. "Words are cheap. Deeds are required." (BBC, 16 November 2009)
After Karzai was re-assigned to his job he convened a "national conference against corruption" in Kabul where he blamed unsolicited foreign aid and contracts for his government's weakness and corruption. He said, "When the government is weakened, when the authority of the president is weakened, the authority of the Parliament and the ministers and their assistants are weakened and their salaries are paid by foreigners, their armoured cars are supplied by the foreigners, they think they have some support from outside and no one can tell them what to do… part of the corruption is a product of this problem. And this has produced another government in parallel to the Afghanistan government." (BBC Persian website, 15 December 2009)
Continuing his defiance of the U.S. and other Nato countries, Karzai invited Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to his palace where he could denounce the occupiers and demand their exit. On another occasion, Karzai threatened the Americans, "If you and the international community pressure me more, I swear that I am going to join the Taliban." (NYT, 2 April 2010)
This behaviour infuriated some U.S. politicians and commentators. They were scandalized that their flunky could be so insubordinate. For instance, columnist Thomas Friedman wrote in the NYT 30 March:
"President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan had invited Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, to Kabul – in order to stick a thumb in the eye of the Obama administration – after the White House had rescinded an invitation to Mr Karzai to come to Washington because the Afghan president had gutted an independent panel that had discovered widespread fraud in his re-election last year… That is what we're getting for risking thousands of U.S. soldiers and having spent $200 billion already. This news is a flashing red light."
It is worth mentioning that McChrystal stayed aloof from these tensions between Karzai and the White House, and during this period warmly received Karzai at his headquarters.
McChrystal's firing has not settled this conflict and open criticisms are still going both ways. For example, recently Afghan Attorney General Mohammad Ishaq Alako said that the American ambassador "had pressed him to bring particular cases against high-profile figures" and instructed him to resign if he did not. Alako continued, "Do diplomatic ethics allow threats such as this one?" (NYT, 29 June 2010)
According to the same report, on 28 June "Representative Nita M. Lowey, Democrat of New York, the chairwoman of the House Appropriations subcommittee on foreign aid, announced she was cutting most of the $3.9 billion in foreign aid requested for Afghanistan by the Obama administration until the country got a handle on corruption."
This poses two questions, or rather, the same question seen from two different angles. On the one hand, since the imperialists appointed their own man, why consider removing him, and continue to criticise him? On the other, what does this mean about Karzai? How can he dare be so disrespectful to those to whom he owes his crown? And why would he challenge them openly?
The point is that because of the complex and deteriorating situation of the occupation he has found some room to manoeuvre. Contradictions between the U.S. and other imperialists and the reactionary rulers of the countries they oppress do not automatically mean that those rulers are independent or represent the national interests of the people.
Further, not only has Karzai found some manoeuvring room in the face of the threat to his position, he may feel that he can achieve some fake legitimacy by verbally challenging the big powers and resisting their removal orders. Other reactionaries put in power by the imperialists have done so before and are still doing it, so why shouldn't Karzai?
After all, the U.S. & Co. knew Karzai and his cabinet were corrupt when they installed him in office. The biggest problem for them is not Karzai but the situation they themselves have brought about. When they invaded Afghanistan, the imperialists promised to rebuild the country and bring it prosperity, security, the liberation of women, peace and democracy. Now, nine years later, the vast majority of people have hardly seen anything but poverty, an economy based on drug trafficking, war, aerial bombardment, murder, rape, insecurity and the continuing oppression of women – and national humiliation. The imperialists are trying to blame everything on a corrupt government. But the corrupt government is not the cause of this situation; rather, it is a product of this war and occupation. In fact the U.S. has little choice but to get on with Karzai because, at least for the moment, they seem to have no alternative to him.
Depending on the development of the situation, this skirmishing could intensify even more and manifest itself in more unpredictable and explosive forms. These debates are indications of objective contradictions.
The sacking of McChrystal and a possible strategy adjustment
What connects the public criticisms voiced by McChrystal and Karzai and those aimed at them is the crisis created by the way the war is going.
McChrystal's removal cannot be limited to what he told Rolling Stone. It is a continuation of disagreements amid an alarming situation for the imperialists.
It seems that McChrystal's sacking has given U.S. policy-makers an opportunity to change some elements of their strategy. "Privately, at least one senior White House official suggested using General McChrystal's exit as an excuse for a housecleaning, " reported the NYT 30 June.
In the policy debate in U.S. government and military circles that began during the last months of the Bush administration and grew during the months after his successor came to office, Obama eventually chose to support the position identified with McChrystal, a large-scale escalation of ground forces. The contending position, identified with Biden and the other people McChrystal ended up rubbishing in Rolling Stone, was that such a large "footprint" (or better said, boot print) would only increase the people's hatred for the occupiers. Now, even though the "surge" is still under way and more American troops are yet to come, already these troops have shown that they may not be able to "clear and hold" established Taliban strongholds as expected, while the Taliban and their allies have been able to mount unexpected offensives against the occupiers in new areas. The other aspect of the new "COIN" (counter-insurgency ) strategy, building up elements of pro-occupation political power in former insurgent areas, has also manifestly failed.
In June of last year Obama fired McChrystal's predecessor and embraced McChrystal and his approach to the war. This new sacking – yet another of the kind of abrupt replacement of top generals that had not occurred in the U.S. since the Korean war – seems to a growing dismay and divisions among those responsible for waging this war.
U.S civilian officials and General Petraeus emphasised that the basic strategy will not change. There is, however, at least one policy that might be adjusted. The Rolling Stone article makes it clear that many American solders are furious with their commanders because they are no longer permitted to "get their gun on", or in other words, spray bullets at any Afghan they feel like killing, and "just bomb the place". The rules of engagement associated with the COIN strategy state that they should try to avoid engagements in which unarmed people may be killed and calling in air power against civilians. This is supposed to help win "hearts and minds", McChrystal has explained to his dissatisfied troops.
At the same time, the Special Operations Forces, commandos described by a McChrystal aid as a "killing machine", often storming into villages at night and firing indiscriminately, have been greatly built up as part of COIN. Under the leadership of McChrystal, formerly in charge of U.S. Special Operations forces worldwide, the number of these commando units has been multiplied from four to nineteen. And for all of McChrystal's stated concern with reducing civilian casualties for what he calls "cold-blooded" reasons – to win the war – Nato forces admit to killing some 90 civilians between January and April of this year, a huge increase from the same period last year. As the general said himself – whether out of chagrin or pride is not clear – "We have shot an amazing number of people, but to my knowledge, none has ever proven to be a threat.” (NYT, 26 March 2020)
These rules of engagement may change. At the U.S. Senate hearing where his new command was confirmed, Petraeus said he wanted "to assure the mothers and fathers of those fighting in Afghanistan that I see it as a moral imperative to bring all assets to bear to protect our men and women in uniform… Those on the ground must have all the support they need when they are in a tough situation." The NYT called this – an indication that the occupiers may go back to the old rules of engagement, with fewer official limits on killing – "his first departure from the policies of the former top American commander, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal." (29 June 2010)
As is clear to anyone who reads the Rolling Stone interview (rollingstone. com), McChrystal is an extreme reactionary in every dimension. His contempt for civilians extends not only to those in Afghanistan but in his home country and others as well. Now Petraeus, whose image is less brutal, seems to be heading towards making the war itself even more brutal. (Actually, both men are highly conscious products of the highest levels of American military and civilian education.) What drives these debates about the rules of engagement, like the policy debate about how to run the war overall, is not mainly the sensibilities of the commanders. It reflects a contradictory objective situation: the more they kill the more the occupiers are hated, but their occupation is inherently hateful and people will resist it no matter what. The occupiers treat all Afghans as potential enemies, and that is increasingly the reality. General Petraeus' comments are a signal that there will be even more murdering of civilians in the next few months.
However the rulers of the U.S. may try to resolve both their objective contradictions and infighting, there is this: President Obama took the occasion of McChrystal's dismissal to remind all concerned that "Our politics often fuels conflict, but we have to renew our sense of common purpose". (Whitehouse. gov, 23 June 2010) He reaffirmed that the U.S. is not about to leave Afghanistan.
The occupation of Afghanistan and all that has been associated with it have given the Taliban, hated by many people in Afghanistan, a chance to find some bases of support among the people in some areas, especially in southern and eastern Afghanistan.
The development of the situation increasingly reveals that the roots of all the problems of Afghanistan – including the Taliban, Karzai, the warlords, the poverty and misery – are all completely tied up with imperialist domination. The big powers have been the main pillar of Afghan reactionaries and their social system for more than a century. The first step to deal with these problems is to fight the imperialists. That is why people everywhere must oppose the occupation of Afghanistan with a forceful voice.
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