27 February 2012. A World to Win News Service. By N. Peyman. The threats against Iran, the sanctions and other economic pressures and the military movements and manoeuvres all testify to the intensification of the contradictions between the US and Iranian regime, 33 years after its foundation. These contradictions have reached such a critical point that an air strike or other form of military intervention against Iran by the US and some of its allies has become a clear possibility.
Why have relations between Iran and the Western powers, especially the US, been so tense for most of the last three decades, and why are they now fast approaching such a dangerous point? What are the forces driving the imperialist powers to another war in a region that is already overloaded with various wars?
These questions are even more striking if we take into account the fact that both the Western powers and the Iranian regime are undergoing crises internally.
According to the constant barrage from the mainstream media, the main concern of the Western powers is Iran's nuclear programme. They argue that the Iranian regime intends to build nuclear weapons. So the Western imperialists are pushing harder and harder to force the Iranian regime to stop enriching uranium, while Iran denies this charge and claims its nuclear programme is for purely civilian purposes.
The pressure so far has included UN Security Council approval for several rounds of economic sanctions against Iranian institutions and the personnel involved in its nuclear programme. Now the US and EU have taken it upon themselves to impose further sanctions against Iran's central bank. On July 1 of this year a ban on the importation of Iranian oil will take effect. These measures are meant to block Iranian exports and make it impossible for the country to import for lack of foreign currency.
But is the US and Western powers' concern about Iran's nuclear programme the real driving force behind the current crisis?
Despite the claims of the mainstream media and political officials whose job is to repeat and spread Western imperialist ruling class propaganda, the claims about the Iranian regime's nuclear programme are highly questionable. In fact their assertions have repeatedly been challenged by genuine experts, investigative reporters and observers familiar with the issue.
First of all, the Western powers and the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have not, so far, been able to provide any credible evidence, let alone proof. Even their intelligence and military officials have not been able to back the claims of their leaders. So they seem to be making so much noise and heading toward war based on a case built on the "suspected intentions" of the Iranian regime that no one has been able to prove.
The US and its allies also claim if Iran succeeds in making nuclear bombs, it would start attacking other countries, especially Israel, and endanger American and Western security.
There seems to be a consensus among experts, however, that even if the US and its allies are right about the Iranian regime's intentions, it could become capable of making only one or a very few bombs in the near future. There is no way that it could match the nuclear arsenal of Israel, said to include more than 200 warheads, let alone the nuclear capability of the imperialist powers. According to experts, this cannot change the military balance of power in the region.
There is also the argument put forward by some imperialist apologists that if Iran goes nuclear, that would start a nuclear arms race in the region, so that Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other countries would have to compete. First of all, experts familiar with the region's economic and political situation argue that political problems in some countries such as Egypt and the lack of infrastructure in others such as Saudi Arabia would make it impossible for them to undertake full-scale nuclear programmes. Secondly, this nuclear arms race has already been started with India and Pakistan. Thirdly, countries such as Turkey are not waiting for Iran to go nuclear. They are already working on it.
So not only is there no definitive evidence that Iran is making nuclear bombs, the arguments about the danger that an Iranian nuclear programme would represent for the security of the world and the stability of the region are exaggerated and do not match the reality. In fact, these arguments are little more than justifications for a hidden agenda – the preparations by the US and its allies for a war against Iran.
Also, as everyone now knows, or should know by now, the US and its allies have repeatedly made up various excuses to start wars in different parts of the world. The most memorable example is the 2003 invasion of Iraq under the cover of accusations about the Saddam Hussein regime's possession of weapons of mass destruction that proved to be a pure invention by George W. Bush and Tony Blair. This has cast even more doubt on the Western powers' real intentions. Many people all over the world simply don't trust the US imperialists and their allies on this issue.
Thus it is not difficult to conclude that even if the Iranian regime's nuclear programme is a concern, it is not the main issue. It cannot, in itself, explain the US's agenda – why it is intensifying the contradictions with Iran and building a case for and preparing military intervention.
If that is not the real issue, what are the real contradictions that are pressing so hard on both sides, and what are its real sources? Why are the US and its allies unhappy with the Iranian Islamic regime?
Some points on the real contradictions between the US and the Islamic Republic and their sources
Anti-Americanism has been a feature of the Iranian Islamic regime over the last three decades. Its content should be more deeply discussed and understood. Yet no matter how much the US might have had difficulty with this feature, still it has gone along with the regime for most of the last three decades. At the same time the history of the relationship between the Iranian Islamic regime and the US over these three decades has been very complex and full of contradictions and compromises that can hardly be explained by noting one or two simple contradictions.
In fact, over the last three decades the world has been in a state of great turbulence. To be more precise, there have been various factors shaping and effecting the relations between the US and the Iranian regime. Among the most important factors are the history of US interference in Iran and the Iranian clergy's attitude towards the US during the reign of the Shah. Another very important factor, one that in most cases has been decisive, is that it has been the world situation that has influenced the relationship between the US and the Islamic regime of Iran. Also this relation has been affected by the contradiction between the US and Islamic fundamentalists that was much intensified for a time.
The 1979 Iranian revolution was not the first time that a popular uprising forced the Shah to abandon his throne and flee the country. He was overthrown by another uprising in 1953 under the nationalist prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh, and brought back to power by a CIA-backed coup d'état. The Shah launched a reign of terror, including the imprisonment, torture and murder of leftist and nationalist activists. The coup and the following 25 years of the Shah's rule, backed and supported by the US, instilled a deep hatred among the Iranian masses for both the Shah and the US. This played a powerful role in the 1979 revolution.
The early 1960s saw a growing contradiction between the clergy and the Shah and the US. This led to the emergence of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and later his exile to Najaf, in Iraq. However, this contradiction was of a very different nature than that between the people and the Shah and the US. The clerics mainly did not support the 1953 uprising of the Iranian people; in fact, they supported the Shah's coup. (Ayatollah Abolghasem Kashani, the most prominent religious representative of the clergy, supported the coup and became the head of the Shah’s Parliament afterward.) That position was never refuted or countered by Khomeini or any of the leaders of the Islamic regime.
The primary reasons for the clerical establishment's opposition to the Shah had to do with aspects of the Shah's 1962 reforms (the so-called "White Revolution") in the country's social and economic structure. These US-backed reforms were meant to more fully integrate Iran's relatively closed economy into the network of world capital. The Islamic forces had a strong connection to the land and feudalism. They particularly did not like the partial land reforms and the rights given to women to vote and hold office, which they saw as a threat to women's traditional status and traditional society in general. They blamed the Shah and the US for opening the country to Western culture, which they saw as anti-Islamic.
During the 1979 Iranian revolution two different contradictions became entangled: on the one hand the people's struggle against the monarchy and the US that supported it, and on the other the contradiction between the clerics and the Shah and the West. This interference paved the way for Khomeini and the clerics to steal the leadership of the revolution and abort it. The overthrow of the Shah was a blow to US interests. But the West was also aware that they could better tolerate the Islamist forces than a revolutionary left that could possibly grow through the continuation of the revolution and take the lead. The West was also very concerned about Soviet influence and pro-Soviet forces such as the Tudeh Party, which had also influenced the Fedayeen guerilla organisation. So the US and other Western powers were quick to limit the extent of the Iranian revolution and the blow to their interests by negotiating the Islamists into power before the revolution got deeper and even more out of hand.
Khomeini and his followers claimed to be the manifestation of the people's revolution, but with their backward ideology they were in fact the thieves of the Iranian revolution and their rise to power was the result of a compromise between backward, reactionary forces and various imperialist powers seeking to put an end to the Iranian revolution.
Clearly one of the main concerns for the US and the West was Soviet influence and the possibility of a Soviet takeover of Iran after the revolution. So they rushed to cut a deal with the Islamists – in other words, the contradiction between the East and West blocs ended up playing a decisive role in this situation. But the East/West conflict over Iran did not end with the bringing of the Islamists to power. In fact, this contradiction continued to colour Iran's political sky over the next decade.
The Soviets saw that an opportunity had opened for them to influence the political scene in Iran and the Middle East, and they did not want to let it pass. They already had the Tudeh party, with its experienced leaders and cadres whom the USSR had trained for years. Through the Tudeh party they were able to split the Fedayeen and pull the majority section to their side, and retain some influence on the other faction as well. Both through the Tudeh party and other channels the Soviets were also influencing some factions of the Islamic forces in power.
During the first eight months of the Islamic regime, its relationship with the US was not acute. There even seem to have been some diplomatic contacts. The occupation of the US embassy in Tehran by so-called pro-Khomeini students had a dramatic effect on this situation. Khomeini subsequently supported the occupation, leading to the collapse of the first Islamic government, which had been formed by the religious nationalists.
While some observers try to explain the US embassy occupation as a spontaneous move by pro-Khomeini students, others believe hidden forces were also at work, or at least taking advantage. For example, some people interpret this move as part of a power struggle between the clerics and the religious nationalists. Others see it as a result of the influence of the Tudeh Party or Soviet influence through other channels. Whatever the real story behind the occupation, the opening for the Soviet Union to enter Iran's political sphere had widened. At the same time, some of the most vicious elements of the Islamic regime, such as the ayatollahs Beheshti, Rafsanjani and Khamenei, became stronger and played a bigger role in the regime. Some clerics, especially those in contact with the students, seemed to have adopted a pro-Soviet tone. This is not to say that Beheshti, Rafsanjani or Khamenei were associated with the Soviet bloc, but at that time there was common ground between them and the pro-Soviet elements and others who wanted to oust the religious nationalist government.
After the US embassy occupation, anti-US slogans became a hallmark of the regime. The revolutionary movement came under even more serious attack by the reactionaries in power. They tried to pin the label of pro-US or US spies on the revolutionaries who had been fighting the Shah and the US, even as negotiations between the US and some elements of the Islamic regime regarding the hostages and how to release them continued. While the Islamic regime claimed to be "neither East nor West", in fact some elements within the regime tended towards the Western bloc and others the Eastern imperialist bloc. In other words, the acute contradiction on the world level had its impact on the Islamic regime.
Ten months after the occupation of the US embassy in Tehran, the Iran-Iraq war started. Again this was the result of a combination of contradictions. This time the US, which encouraged and fuelled this war for eight years, had multiple goals: to eliminate the pro-Soviet elements of the Iraqi regime, to regain the initiative in Iran's internal affairs, and, most importantly, to attack whatever was left of the revolution's achievements.
Doubtlessly there was an implicit unity between the US and the Islamic regime on the issue of suppressing the revolution. In fact, from very early on the Islamic regime used the war to suppress the revolutionary movement and unify and consolidate the regime around the Khomeini, Rafsanjani and Khamenei gang. This lead to the coup by Khomeini and the Islamic Republic Party on 20 June 1981, nine months after the start of the war.
Because of the rivalry between the superpowers and their respective attempts to grab Iran, and also the existence of the forces within the Iranian regime who had tendencies towards the West and the East, the Islamic regime was able to swing between the West and East bloc.
During the following years of terror and the suppression of the people and revolutionaries, tens of thousands of communists and other revolutionaries were murdered and many more imprisoned. Tens of thousands were driven into exile. During this period, the silence of the US and the West was deafening. This was an indication that they were satisfied with the brutality they saw the Islamic regime carry out.
The end of the war brought the consolidation of the Islamic Republic. The vast majority of the remaining political prisoners were executed in 1988. Western media and officials began talking about what they saw as the regime's stability. The end of the war meant an era of reconstruction for the Islamic regime. To accomplish that, it had to more fully integrate the country into the world economy and establish close relations with imperialist financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. Ali Akbar Rafsanjani became president and his supporters gave him the name of "commander of reconstruction".
This period coincided with the beginning of the collapse of the Eastern bloc. The closing of the gap between the East and West began to limit the Islamic Republic's ability to manoeuvre between the two blocs. The elements close to the Soviets became weaker and had to change their position. At the same time the need for capital to build up the war-ravaged infrastructure and economy based on a new imperialist-dependent bourgeoisie exerted a Westward pull on the Islamic regime.
Due to the history of the relations between the West and the traditionalist Islamic clergy and the memory of the American embassy occupation, on the one hand, and on the other the Iranian people's hatred for US imperialism, it was impossible for the process of normalisation between the Islamic regime and the West to go smoothly. There were many contradictions and obstacles.
In fact, anti-US gestures and slogans had allowed the Islamic regime to gain many things, including stealing and then suppressing the revolution and murdering and imprisoning the revolutionaries, and consolidating its power and achieving a kind of legitimacy both in Iran and in the region. It was not easy for them to abandon such slogans, even though they had already taken up many aspects of imperialist dependency.
During Rafsanjani's presidency, relations with the West increased mainly through economic and financial cooperation. The export of oil to Western countries returned to its pre-revolution level. Trade with US allies in the region as well as European countries such as Germany and Italy also increased.
In the mid 1990s a regime faction that had helped it consolidate through the years of terror and suppression won the presidential election under the banner of reformism. Mohammad Khatami became the president and subsequently this faction won the majority in parliament.
They started to increase and improve Iran's relations with Western countries. Aiming to normalize relations with the West and Europe in particular, Khatami visited Germany, France and Italy. Germany and Italy became Iran's main trade partners. The giant French oil company Total invested a huge amount of capital in Iranian oil fields. The European countries objected to and defied the US law that would punish foreign companies for doing business with Iran.
France, Germany and UK even formed a team to negotiate with Iran on its nuclear programme, mainly to cool down the US approach towards Iran and prevent a possible military intervention.
With the reformist faction running the government, the power struggle within the Islamic regime sharpened. The conservative faction fought with all its might to regain the initiative. During this period the Islamic regime laid the basis to move towards a more defined relationship with the West. However this development was influenced not only by the regime's internal power struggle, but also, in a different sphere, the 11 September 2011 events in the US, the contradiction between the US and the Al-Qaeda Islamic fundamentalists, and the subsequent American strategy for the region. Along with Iraq and North Korea, Iran was termed part of the "axis of evil", countries the US accused of supporting terrorism.
After Khatami's two terms as president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president with the help of the Basij (a paramilitary force) and the Pasdaran (the so-called Revolutionary Guards). He won a second term through a rigged election with the support of Ayatollah Khamenei, the spiritual leader of the Islamic regime after Khomeini. This sparked a massive protest movement that lasted for months and brought millions into the streets of Tehran and other cities. This power struggle within the Islamic regime was resolved violently with the elimination of the reformist faction of the ruling party from the regime and the imprisonment or exile of many of its leaders and members. As the reformists were sidelined, relations with the Western powers, in particular the Europeans, also went into decline.
Since then, Iran has strengthened its economic, political and military relations with China and Russia. During the last three years China became Iran's leading economic partner by far. China imports 22 percent of Iranian oil exports, whereas before the oil embargo all the EU countries combined were importing 18 percent. Overall, Asian countries, including China, India, Japan and South Korea, account for 60 percent of Iran's oil exports. Iran has increasingly conducted its currency transactions through Russian and Chinese banks. During the first four months of 2011, 80 percent of the regime's income from oil and gas exports went through Russian and Chinese banks. Other reports indicate that Iran is calling on Chinese and Russian oil companies to invest in its oil and gas industry.
While the Iranian economy has been increasingly integrated into the world capitalist system and this course has accelerated with today's globalization, at the same time the world situation has allowed its Islamist rulers to bounce between different imperialist powers. If the bouncing during the 1980s was between the US and Soviet blocs, after the collapse of the Soviet Union it has been first between the US and European countries, and then between the West on the one hand and Russia and China on the other.
This change of direction by the Iranian regime is not unrelated to the orientation of different factions who have benefited from establishing relations with various imperialist powers. At the same time this approach also explains the Europeans' tougher position on the Iranian nuclear programme in the last few years.
Some points on the recent crisis
Going back to the recent crisis and the intensification of the contradiction, both the West and the Islamic regime are in the middle of economic and political crisis. The question is why both sides are heading towards a confrontation in such a situation.
The US and the West as a whole are pursuing their global interests in terms of control over the world, the new order that the US has been seeking to establish and stabilise for nearly two decades. Control of the Middle East and its oil is crucial and central to this world order. In fact, to secure its long-term position as the chief of the imperialist system in the present world situation, the US needs a regime in Iran that would cooperate with the American regional programme. Because of its nature, its factions and its historical formation, the Islamic regime refuses to play the classical role that the US requires in the region. Moreover, seeking allies it can rely on, it has increasingly distanced itself from the West and become oriented towards Russia and China in recent years. This is something that the US and the West cannot tolerate any longer and why they are running out of patience.
In addition to the crisis in the Islamic regime's relations with the US and the West, it is facing deeper internal crisis, too.
The regime's economic, political and ideological policies have reached their limits and put tremendous pressure on the masses. The uprising of the Iranian people after the rigged election showed the depth of discontent with the regime. The Iranian economy, driven by the interests of a narrow section of the ruling class inside the country and the world capitalist system, was in crisis even before the current sanctions. These sanctions imposed by the Western powers, particularly the boycott of Iranian oil and gas, will surely magnify the pressure on the country's economy, due to Iran's dependency on world imperialism.
Another crisis the Iranian regime is struggling with is the growing contention among its various factions. The most important aspects of this political crisis are the regime's chronic inability to unite its various factions and the loss of legitimacy among the masses. Both aspects have intensified in recent years. The ousting of the regime's reformist faction after the rigged election was considered a coup, but the elimination of the reformists did not result in unity among the other factions. On the contrary, it ignited a factional fight within the conservative sections of the ruling power structure. This has led to the formation of various military and security centres within the same state, leaving it weaker than ever, with no prospect of regaining its lost strength.
While the US is counting on the regime's weaknesses to make regime change possible now, despite the dangers inherent in an attack from abroad the Iranian regime might also be counting on it as a way to resolve its internal crisis, at least temporarily. It is already using the current threats and sanctions to unite its ranks and the masses, even if temporarily, and justify the economic crisis that is making people's lives harder and harder. In short, it is trying to use these various contradictions as a way to navigate safely through the current crises.
The people and the threat of a war
In this situation, both the imperialists and the Islamic regime are trying to fool the people and win their support. Some anti-regime forces call on people to support an invasion by the US and other imperialists to get rid of it. There are also those who oppose the US and call on the people to support the regime. Neither stance considers the people as a potentially independent force that can free itself from both the imperialists and the backward, reactionary Islamic regime.
The various contradictions in Iranian-US relations have been complex and involved compromises. But the contradiction between the people of Iran and US imperialism is not the same as the contradiction between the US and the Islamic Republic. At the same time the contradiction between the people and the Islamic regime is not the same as the contradiction between the US and the Islamic regime. If the people tail any of those forces, they will end up oppressed and exploited by one or both of them.
The Islamic religious regime is brutal, ideologically backward and anti-women. It is economically dependent on world imperialism and belongs to the past. The various factions within the regime are seeking to gain the upper hand over one another by relying on different big powers so as to be able to impose their rule over the people for the long term.
The people of Iran and the real anti-imperialists have no interest in siding with any of those forces. Their interests lie in fighting them all.
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Sonntag, 25. März 2012
Sonntag, 5. Februar 2012
Angriff »schlechte Idee«
Kleine Flotte, aber gute Abwehr:
Pentagon-Experten äußern Respekt vor Irans asymmetrischem Verteidigungspotential. Selbst US-Flugzeugträger gefährdet
Von Rainer Rupp
JungeWelt vom 4. Februar 2012 (auf Kommunisten-online am 8. Februar 2012) – Laut Jahresbericht »The Military Balance 2011« des »International Institute for Strategic Studies« (IISS) in London verfügt Iran über 23 U-Boote, hundert und mehr Patrouillen- und Torpedoboote für küstennahen Einsatz, fünf Minenleger und -sucher, 13 amphibische Landungsschiffe und 26 Versorgungsschiffe. Für die im Persischen Golf und außerhalb der Straße von Hormus operierenden hochmodernen Einheiten der US-Kriegsmarine stellt die iranische Marine eine Eintagsfliege dar. Auch der stellvertretende Oberkommandeur der russischen Kriegsmarine, Admiral Iwan Kapitanets, gab daher in einem Interview mit Interfax (30.12.2011) der regulären iranischen Marine »keine Chance, dem unvergleichlichen Potenzial einer US-Flugzeugträgergruppe etwas entgegenzusetzen«.
Wenn sich die iranische Militärführung dennoch sehr zuversichtlich zeigt, z.B. die Straße von Hormus dauerhaft sperren und die US-Übermacht im Golf vernichten zu können, dann leidet sie nicht unter krankhaftem Größenwahn, wie ihre ebenso ignoranten wie arroganten Schreiberlinge in westlichen Medien gerne unterstellen, sondern sie wird auch von den Fachleuten der US-Streitkräfte sehr ernst genommen. Die Iraner haben nämlich eine Doktrin der asymmetrischen Kriegsführung entwickelt, bei der Tausende kleine und kleinste Boote, die mit modernsten, zielgenauen Raketen- und Torpedowaffen ausgerüstet sind, plötzlich aus dem Nichts auftauchen und im Schwarm ihre Angriffe vortragen, um so auch den stärksten Gegner zu überwältigen.
Für Schwarmangriffe eignet sich die iranische Golfküste mit über 600 tief eingeschnittenen Fjorden besonders gut. Diese sind trotz der Überlegenheit der US-Airforce aus der Luft nur schwer zu kontrollieren, zumal es den Amerikanern – ähnlich wie im Krieg gegen Jugoslawien 1999 – kaum gelingen dürfte, die taktische Luftabwehr des gegnerischen Landes zu eliminieren. Außerdem müßte die US-Kriegsmarine mit Tausenden entsprechend bestückter Lastwagen rechnen, die plötzlich an der Küste erscheinen, um ihre Raketen abzuschießen. Zugleich kann die gegen Iran und China entwickelte US-Militärdoktrin des Air-Sea-Battle schlecht zur Anwendung kommen, weil Teheran jüngst mit der spektakulären elektronischen Übernahme und erzwungenen Landung der US-Aufklärungsdrone RQ-170 Sentinel ein Kernstück aus der US-Angriffsstrategie herausgebrochen hat.
Vor diesem Hintergrund bekommt die Bemerkung des Chefs der iranischen Marine, Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, daß die Schließung der Straße von Hormus »so einfach ist, wie ein Glas Wasser zu trinken«, eine reale Bedeutung. Der US-Militärführung ist wohl bewußt, daß sie im Falle eines Kriegs mit Iran auch selbst schwere Verluste hinnehmen müßte. Daher kann der Öffentlichkeit ein Angriff nicht – wie im Fall Irak noch geschehen – als gemütlicher »Verdauungsspaziergang« für das US-Militär verkauft werden, wie das die neokonservativen Kriegstreiber der »Israel Firsters« (siehe unten) derzeit mit großem Eifer und noch mehr Demagogie versuchen.
Wie hoch das Pentagon die asymmetrische Schlagkraft des Iran einschätzt, geht aus einem Bericht des US-Finanznachrichtendienstes Blomberg vom März 2007 hervor. Demnach hatte das Pentagon auch nach sieben Jahren intensiver Forschungs- und Entwicklungsarbeit bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt keine effektiven Abwehrmaßnahmen gegen die »sehr niedrig und super schnell« knapp über den Wellen fliegenden, von Rußland gebauten und von Iran weiterentwickelten Rakete mit dem NATO-Code »Sizzler« gefunden. Laut Experten ist mit dieser Waffe der Abschuß eines US-Flugzeugträgers im Persischen Golf so einfach, wie für einen Jäger eine auf dem Wasser sitzende Ente zu erlegen. Selbst das speziell zum Schutz von US-Flugzeugträgern auf Begleitschiffen installierte, hoch gelobte Aegis-System zur Abwehr von Raketenangriffen sei gegen die »Sizzler« nutzlos. Laut US-Admiral a.D. Eric McVadon zufolge ist die Reaktionszeit zwischen der Entdeckung der »Sizzler« und deren Einschlag selbst für automatisierte Abwehrsysteme zu kurz.
Die »Sizzler« sei »einzigartig«, urteilen Pentagon-Wissenschaftler, denn in ihrer Anflugphase sei sie sogar dazu fähig, höchst effiziente Ausweichmanöver zu fliegen und wie ein Hase im dreidimensionalen Raum Haken zu schlagen. Bis heute scheint das Pentagon keine effektive Abwehr gefunden zu haben. Der relativ »handliche« Flugzeugträgerkiller, der auch von kleinen Booten abgefeuert werden kann, ist aber nur eine von vielen, für die asymmetrische Kriegsführung Irans geeignete Waffen, welche Teheran laut Vorwurf von US-Außenministerin Hillary Clinton gemeinsam mit China ständig weiter entwickelt. Dazu gehört auch eine ebenfalls ursprünglich von Rußland entwickelte Unterwasserrakete des Typs VA-111 Shkval, vor der die US-Navy ebenfalls großen Respekt hat.
Kein Wunder, daß General Michael Hayden, unter Präsident George W. Bush Chef der CIA, der lautstarken Kampagne der Angriffsbefürworter öffentlich in die Arme fällt und erklärt, ein Angriff auf Iran sei »eine schlechte Idee«. Ohne eine Besetzung des Landes, die niemand auch nur ins Auge fassen will, sei ein Militärschlag für die USA kontraproduktiv.
Pentagon-Experten äußern Respekt vor Irans asymmetrischem Verteidigungspotential. Selbst US-Flugzeugträger gefährdet
Von Rainer Rupp
JungeWelt vom 4. Februar 2012 (auf Kommunisten-online am 8. Februar 2012) – Laut Jahresbericht »The Military Balance 2011« des »International Institute for Strategic Studies« (IISS) in London verfügt Iran über 23 U-Boote, hundert und mehr Patrouillen- und Torpedoboote für küstennahen Einsatz, fünf Minenleger und -sucher, 13 amphibische Landungsschiffe und 26 Versorgungsschiffe. Für die im Persischen Golf und außerhalb der Straße von Hormus operierenden hochmodernen Einheiten der US-Kriegsmarine stellt die iranische Marine eine Eintagsfliege dar. Auch der stellvertretende Oberkommandeur der russischen Kriegsmarine, Admiral Iwan Kapitanets, gab daher in einem Interview mit Interfax (30.12.2011) der regulären iranischen Marine »keine Chance, dem unvergleichlichen Potenzial einer US-Flugzeugträgergruppe etwas entgegenzusetzen«.
Wenn sich die iranische Militärführung dennoch sehr zuversichtlich zeigt, z.B. die Straße von Hormus dauerhaft sperren und die US-Übermacht im Golf vernichten zu können, dann leidet sie nicht unter krankhaftem Größenwahn, wie ihre ebenso ignoranten wie arroganten Schreiberlinge in westlichen Medien gerne unterstellen, sondern sie wird auch von den Fachleuten der US-Streitkräfte sehr ernst genommen. Die Iraner haben nämlich eine Doktrin der asymmetrischen Kriegsführung entwickelt, bei der Tausende kleine und kleinste Boote, die mit modernsten, zielgenauen Raketen- und Torpedowaffen ausgerüstet sind, plötzlich aus dem Nichts auftauchen und im Schwarm ihre Angriffe vortragen, um so auch den stärksten Gegner zu überwältigen.
Für Schwarmangriffe eignet sich die iranische Golfküste mit über 600 tief eingeschnittenen Fjorden besonders gut. Diese sind trotz der Überlegenheit der US-Airforce aus der Luft nur schwer zu kontrollieren, zumal es den Amerikanern – ähnlich wie im Krieg gegen Jugoslawien 1999 – kaum gelingen dürfte, die taktische Luftabwehr des gegnerischen Landes zu eliminieren. Außerdem müßte die US-Kriegsmarine mit Tausenden entsprechend bestückter Lastwagen rechnen, die plötzlich an der Küste erscheinen, um ihre Raketen abzuschießen. Zugleich kann die gegen Iran und China entwickelte US-Militärdoktrin des Air-Sea-Battle schlecht zur Anwendung kommen, weil Teheran jüngst mit der spektakulären elektronischen Übernahme und erzwungenen Landung der US-Aufklärungsdrone RQ-170 Sentinel ein Kernstück aus der US-Angriffsstrategie herausgebrochen hat.
Vor diesem Hintergrund bekommt die Bemerkung des Chefs der iranischen Marine, Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, daß die Schließung der Straße von Hormus »so einfach ist, wie ein Glas Wasser zu trinken«, eine reale Bedeutung. Der US-Militärführung ist wohl bewußt, daß sie im Falle eines Kriegs mit Iran auch selbst schwere Verluste hinnehmen müßte. Daher kann der Öffentlichkeit ein Angriff nicht – wie im Fall Irak noch geschehen – als gemütlicher »Verdauungsspaziergang« für das US-Militär verkauft werden, wie das die neokonservativen Kriegstreiber der »Israel Firsters« (siehe unten) derzeit mit großem Eifer und noch mehr Demagogie versuchen.
Wie hoch das Pentagon die asymmetrische Schlagkraft des Iran einschätzt, geht aus einem Bericht des US-Finanznachrichtendienstes Blomberg vom März 2007 hervor. Demnach hatte das Pentagon auch nach sieben Jahren intensiver Forschungs- und Entwicklungsarbeit bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt keine effektiven Abwehrmaßnahmen gegen die »sehr niedrig und super schnell« knapp über den Wellen fliegenden, von Rußland gebauten und von Iran weiterentwickelten Rakete mit dem NATO-Code »Sizzler« gefunden. Laut Experten ist mit dieser Waffe der Abschuß eines US-Flugzeugträgers im Persischen Golf so einfach, wie für einen Jäger eine auf dem Wasser sitzende Ente zu erlegen. Selbst das speziell zum Schutz von US-Flugzeugträgern auf Begleitschiffen installierte, hoch gelobte Aegis-System zur Abwehr von Raketenangriffen sei gegen die »Sizzler« nutzlos. Laut US-Admiral a.D. Eric McVadon zufolge ist die Reaktionszeit zwischen der Entdeckung der »Sizzler« und deren Einschlag selbst für automatisierte Abwehrsysteme zu kurz.
Die »Sizzler« sei »einzigartig«, urteilen Pentagon-Wissenschaftler, denn in ihrer Anflugphase sei sie sogar dazu fähig, höchst effiziente Ausweichmanöver zu fliegen und wie ein Hase im dreidimensionalen Raum Haken zu schlagen. Bis heute scheint das Pentagon keine effektive Abwehr gefunden zu haben. Der relativ »handliche« Flugzeugträgerkiller, der auch von kleinen Booten abgefeuert werden kann, ist aber nur eine von vielen, für die asymmetrische Kriegsführung Irans geeignete Waffen, welche Teheran laut Vorwurf von US-Außenministerin Hillary Clinton gemeinsam mit China ständig weiter entwickelt. Dazu gehört auch eine ebenfalls ursprünglich von Rußland entwickelte Unterwasserrakete des Typs VA-111 Shkval, vor der die US-Navy ebenfalls großen Respekt hat.
Kein Wunder, daß General Michael Hayden, unter Präsident George W. Bush Chef der CIA, der lautstarken Kampagne der Angriffsbefürworter öffentlich in die Arme fällt und erklärt, ein Angriff auf Iran sei »eine schlechte Idee«. Ohne eine Besetzung des Landes, die niemand auch nur ins Auge fassen will, sei ein Militärschlag für die USA kontraproduktiv.
Samstag, 3. Dezember 2011
Iran: Lake Urmia is suffering from the Islamic Republic too!
Follow is an article signed by Omid Behrang from issue no 56 of Haghighat, the publication of the Communist Party of Iran (Marxist-Leninist-Maoist).
Lake Urmia is on the verge of drying up. This would be a disaster not only for the environment but also the lives and livelihood of millions of people. But sorrow at the lake' collapse is being transformed into determination to struggle by the people of the cities of Iran's Azerbaijan. The widespread youth protests in some of these cities has won a wave of support of the people all over the country. These protests embody the cry of a lake under threat which is demanding immediate action to rescue it.
While the Islamic Republic regime withdrew an emergency bill to save the lake, the people of Azerbaijan chanted, "Lake Urmia is dying, the Parliament orders its murder". The regime, as usual, suppressed these protests and harassed, beat and arrested those who consciously rose to defend the environment. It was reported that so far four people have been killed and many more injured in those protests, and around 4,000 were arrested.
There is no doubt that the sacrifice and the effort of the people of Azerbaijan will not be wasted and will contribute to sowing the seeds of revolution. The Islamic Republic will have to pay for murdering this lake and all other crimes it has committed. The truth is that even nature has lost its patience in the face of its destruction by the rotten capitalist system and demanding a revolution.
Why Lake Urmia is drying up
With a length of 150 kilometres and a width of 50, Lake Urmia is one of Iran's biggest lakes and the twentieth biggest lake in the world. It is more than 400,000 years old. Its approximately hundred islands were once home to a broad variety of plants and animals. People around it used its coastal sediments for medical purposes. Now around 60 percent of the lake has turned into salt desert. The average depth of the lake has fallen from 16 metres to seven metres. If action is not taken urgently, the lake will dry up entirely in the next two to five years, according to environmental experts.
The consequences for the region's people would be dire. Breathing in the salt and metal residue is a health hazard. The disappearance of the lake's water and the humidity it creates will severely harm crop lands and grazing lands. Even worse, salt cyclones could destroy farms as far way as of 200 kilometres.
At present, the lake has retreated 15 kilometres from its former banks and almost 40 villages around it have been ruined. People who made their living from the tourism in the region or from the lake ferries are in serious trouble. If the dying out continues at this pace, one of Iran's main agricultural areas will be destroyed, along with the lives and incomes of several million people (between 4 and 14 million, according to various estimates). A deliberate murder is under way! The logic of profit and the anarchy of the capitalist system are targeting the life of this lake.
A plan drawn up during the presidency of Ali Akbar Rafsanjani (1989-97) has been carried out step by step for twenty years. The development plan adopted by the "commander of construction", as Rafsanjani's supporters called him, was based on the ever greater plundering of natural resources and ever greater exploitation of the labour force. Export-oriented agriculture replaced the relatively self-sufficient local economy, or, better said, destroyed it. The plan was that the export of locally-grown fruit would enable the government to pocket more foreign currency. In order to meet this target, over the last 20 years, 36 dams were built on 21 rivers that run into Lake Urmia. Thus the lake was robbed of its main sources of water, approximately 5.5 million cubic metres. Moreover, the government encouraged landowners who cultivate fruit to dig deep wells. The result was the drying up of the underground water supplies that were another of the lake's main water sources.
A decrease in rain in some of the last few years has also added to the problem. The Islamic Republic authorities claim that the shortage of rain has been the main factor drying up the lake, but that is false because similar lakes in the broader region, such as Lake Van in Turkey and Lake Sevan in Armenia, where similar meteorological conditions prevail, are not threatened by this fate.
Government institutions such as the Pasdaran (the regime's "Islamic Revolutionary Guards" and the Jihad of Construction have amassed great wealth by selling the water stored behind the dams, the orchards grown in the newly-dry land and villas built around the dams.
The Islamic Republic's order to build roads and bridges over this lake has caused further destruction. More than five billion tons of sand and gravel have been poured into the lake to build a causeway that has divided the lake into two, disrupting its ecosystem. The natural circulation of water and air and the sources of nutrition that were formed along the banks of the lake were destroyed. The lack of a natural exchange of water between the two parts of the lake quickly increased the amount of salt in the northern part, leading to the extinction of the only aqueous creature, the Artemia (the source of what is known as Lake Urmia caviar) there. The noise and ecological pollution produced by vehicular traffic have had serious consequences for the region's birds.
Some people believe that the Mafia-like companies involved in this project are connected with Ayatolah Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic. But the workings of the capitalist system inevitably produce anarchy and disorder. This anarchy results in the destruction of human and natural resources. There is no logic and no long term programme that commands this system except the logic of profit. The fate of Lake Urmia, like that of millions of Iranians, is marked by the development plans or "restructuring" plans Rafsanjani put forward in accord with IMF and World Bank proposals. The essence of this imperialist-dependent restructuring has been destruction and anarchy in the service of the interests of a minority of the society, the exploiters. For such a system, the long-term results of their economic plans are not important.
At the moment, these so-called "self-reliant developmental plans" have reached a dead end. Salt cyclones have damaged the products (fruit) that was supposed to be exported and endangered the people's health. If previously it was possible to dig a six metre-deep well to find water for agriculture, currently wells must be drilled to a depth of 120 metres. At the same time, the lake's now salty water is finding its way into the wells, often making them useless.
To protect the environment, a class solution is needed, not a national solution
In today's world, the protection of the environment is one of the most essential problems facing humanity. In fact, human existence itself is under threat. Any solution in the framework of the existing regime or any like it would only add to the problems.
A regime for whom the people have no value cannot be expected to respect nature.
The struggle to protect Lake Urmia has turned into a struggle against national oppression. Some see the deliberate killing of the lake as an expression of the Persian chauvinism that tramples Azari rights. It is true that the Islamic Republic allocates most of the budget to the central regions and holds back funding for the remote regions of oppressed nations. This is a clear expression of discrimination and national oppression. The main reason for the oppression of this region is that the Islamic Republic does not want to loosen its control over these regions. The regime knows that retreat on this issue means giving in to the demands of the Azari people. National oppression of minority peoples in Iran is one of the regime's main pillars, and it doesn't compromise on this.
Many Azari youth see this as a national (Azari) issue. Some people are trying to use the issue of protecting Lake Urmia to promote their own extreme and reactionary nationalism, such as pan-Turkism. Without drawing a dividing line with these political groups which are often connected to the regime in one way or another and/or the capitalist powers on a world scale, it is not possible to achieve a real solution. Within the narrow framework of "my land" and "my nation" it is not possible to resolve a problem that is the product of a global economic and social system. Protecting the environment is a country-wide and far more importantly global issue.
The only way to understand the real problem and the real solution is with an international horizon and a scientific outlook. So it is necessary to rupture from the common bourgeois thinking and to look for a real and serious solution.
It was the thinkers of the bourgeois system that for the first time talked about the domination of human beings over nature. They distorted the relationship between humans as part of nature and nature itself, in order to protect the interests and functioning of their system and alienate human beings from nature. Marx and Engels, the outstanding theoreticians of communist revolution, were among the first to criticize such views.
They emphasised that humanity itself is a part of nature. The permanent dependence of human beings on the natural environment they are part of limits humanity's ability to dominate nature. As Marx said ''Nature is man's inorganic body – that is to say, nature insofar as it is not the human body. Man lives from nature – i.e. nature is his body – and he must maintain a continuing dialogue with it if he is not to die. To say that man's physical and mental life is linked to nature simply means that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of nature.” (Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844). Nobody owns the land and other natural resources. Humanity is only its caretaker and must hand it over in better condition to the next generation. That is why Engels emphasized ''Let us not, however, flatter ourselves over much on account of our human victories over nature. For each such victory nature takes its revenge on us. Each victory... at every step we are reminded that we by no means rule over nature like a conqueror over a foreign people, like someone standing outside nature — but we, with flesh, blood and brain, belong to nature, and exist in its midst, and that all our mastery of it consists in the fact that we have the advantage over all other creatures of being able to learn its laws and apply them correctly.'' ( John Bellamy Foster, Marx's Ecology: Materialism and Nature).
Only the class that is suffering the most including the most from pollution can overcome the system that is based on profit and liberate the society.
The proletariat is the only class who can overcome the profit system. This class can liberate itself only by fully liberating all humanity and nature from the capitalist system.
Lake Urmia cannot be protected without revolution
It is possible to save Lake Urmia from collapse by taking urgent action, such as releasing the waters trapped behind the dams, preventing the digging of deep wells, banning the cultivation of crops around the lake such as sugar beets that need a lot of water. It is also possible to allocate funding and pay compensation to those whose lives and income have been seriously damaged. It is possible to mobilise the masses, and to combine the knowledge of experts and technology on a countrywide and international scale with the determination and will of the masses of people in Azerbaijan to find other solutions.
But under the Islamic Republic it is impossible to proceed in this manner. A regime that is deeply woven into the international profit system, one where corruption, robbery, suppression, crime and superstition and religion prevail, can do nothing to rescue the lake and save the environment and lives of the people. The Islamic Republic is resisting the people's demands because it is the guardian of the dominant economic and social structure in Iran and in particular Azerbaijan. The carrying out of even such simple measures would mean disrupting the functioning of the economic structure of the region, overturning the existing social relations and political power, and challenging the existing relations between the dominant and oppressed nations and the rich and poor. Effective measures to save the lake could only become possible by organising a revolution in social relations, a revolution whose aim is the interests of the people and nature. The first step of such revolution is the revolutionary overthrow of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
To change the relationship between humanity and nature, first of all there must be a change in the relationships among the people. Nature will face plunder and destruction until there is a just and free society whose aim is to eliminate all forms of oppression and exploitation. In today's world, the protection of the environment is a complex task. There are a variety of contradictions. But by reviewing all the positive and negative experiences of the past, including socialism in the Soviet Union and China in the days of Lenin, Stalin and Mao, humanity can make a decisive breakthrough.
The revolutionary communists are reviewing and learning from the past experiences of building socialism in China during the time of Mao and in Soviet Union during Lenin and Stalin. We are learning from the positive experience under Lenin's leadership when for the first time, in 1920 in the Soviet Union, a plan for the protection of natural regions was established, and the positive experience of socialist China when a special plan for reducing the harmful effects of industrial waste was organised, and also learning from the negative experience of over reliance on developing the productive forces in the Soviet Union during Stalin that led to over use of the natural resources.
There is also the reality of a short sided emphasis by the communists on the welfare of the people without regard to effects on nature and economic development. Consequently the development of the productive forces caused too much pressure on nature and natural forces and used up natural resources more than necessary. The scientific and critical summation of these experiences is part of new synthesis of the science of communism that is essential for leading a victorious revolution by the masses of people.
Once one of the dreams of the people of Azerbaijan was to transform Lake Urmia from a salt water body to a fresh water lake. A dream that could have turned into reality by controlling the salt of the Ahaar and Sabalan rivers (two rivers from north Azerbaijan that run into Lake Urmia. That dream will come true when the social relations among the people are transformed by communist revolution, a revolution that can combine a wise ecology and the liberation of humanity.
Lake Urmia is on the verge of drying up. This would be a disaster not only for the environment but also the lives and livelihood of millions of people. But sorrow at the lake' collapse is being transformed into determination to struggle by the people of the cities of Iran's Azerbaijan. The widespread youth protests in some of these cities has won a wave of support of the people all over the country. These protests embody the cry of a lake under threat which is demanding immediate action to rescue it.
While the Islamic Republic regime withdrew an emergency bill to save the lake, the people of Azerbaijan chanted, "Lake Urmia is dying, the Parliament orders its murder". The regime, as usual, suppressed these protests and harassed, beat and arrested those who consciously rose to defend the environment. It was reported that so far four people have been killed and many more injured in those protests, and around 4,000 were arrested.
There is no doubt that the sacrifice and the effort of the people of Azerbaijan will not be wasted and will contribute to sowing the seeds of revolution. The Islamic Republic will have to pay for murdering this lake and all other crimes it has committed. The truth is that even nature has lost its patience in the face of its destruction by the rotten capitalist system and demanding a revolution.
Why Lake Urmia is drying up
With a length of 150 kilometres and a width of 50, Lake Urmia is one of Iran's biggest lakes and the twentieth biggest lake in the world. It is more than 400,000 years old. Its approximately hundred islands were once home to a broad variety of plants and animals. People around it used its coastal sediments for medical purposes. Now around 60 percent of the lake has turned into salt desert. The average depth of the lake has fallen from 16 metres to seven metres. If action is not taken urgently, the lake will dry up entirely in the next two to five years, according to environmental experts.
The consequences for the region's people would be dire. Breathing in the salt and metal residue is a health hazard. The disappearance of the lake's water and the humidity it creates will severely harm crop lands and grazing lands. Even worse, salt cyclones could destroy farms as far way as of 200 kilometres.
At present, the lake has retreated 15 kilometres from its former banks and almost 40 villages around it have been ruined. People who made their living from the tourism in the region or from the lake ferries are in serious trouble. If the dying out continues at this pace, one of Iran's main agricultural areas will be destroyed, along with the lives and incomes of several million people (between 4 and 14 million, according to various estimates). A deliberate murder is under way! The logic of profit and the anarchy of the capitalist system are targeting the life of this lake.
A plan drawn up during the presidency of Ali Akbar Rafsanjani (1989-97) has been carried out step by step for twenty years. The development plan adopted by the "commander of construction", as Rafsanjani's supporters called him, was based on the ever greater plundering of natural resources and ever greater exploitation of the labour force. Export-oriented agriculture replaced the relatively self-sufficient local economy, or, better said, destroyed it. The plan was that the export of locally-grown fruit would enable the government to pocket more foreign currency. In order to meet this target, over the last 20 years, 36 dams were built on 21 rivers that run into Lake Urmia. Thus the lake was robbed of its main sources of water, approximately 5.5 million cubic metres. Moreover, the government encouraged landowners who cultivate fruit to dig deep wells. The result was the drying up of the underground water supplies that were another of the lake's main water sources.
A decrease in rain in some of the last few years has also added to the problem. The Islamic Republic authorities claim that the shortage of rain has been the main factor drying up the lake, but that is false because similar lakes in the broader region, such as Lake Van in Turkey and Lake Sevan in Armenia, where similar meteorological conditions prevail, are not threatened by this fate.
Government institutions such as the Pasdaran (the regime's "Islamic Revolutionary Guards" and the Jihad of Construction have amassed great wealth by selling the water stored behind the dams, the orchards grown in the newly-dry land and villas built around the dams.
The Islamic Republic's order to build roads and bridges over this lake has caused further destruction. More than five billion tons of sand and gravel have been poured into the lake to build a causeway that has divided the lake into two, disrupting its ecosystem. The natural circulation of water and air and the sources of nutrition that were formed along the banks of the lake were destroyed. The lack of a natural exchange of water between the two parts of the lake quickly increased the amount of salt in the northern part, leading to the extinction of the only aqueous creature, the Artemia (the source of what is known as Lake Urmia caviar) there. The noise and ecological pollution produced by vehicular traffic have had serious consequences for the region's birds.
Some people believe that the Mafia-like companies involved in this project are connected with Ayatolah Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic. But the workings of the capitalist system inevitably produce anarchy and disorder. This anarchy results in the destruction of human and natural resources. There is no logic and no long term programme that commands this system except the logic of profit. The fate of Lake Urmia, like that of millions of Iranians, is marked by the development plans or "restructuring" plans Rafsanjani put forward in accord with IMF and World Bank proposals. The essence of this imperialist-dependent restructuring has been destruction and anarchy in the service of the interests of a minority of the society, the exploiters. For such a system, the long-term results of their economic plans are not important.
At the moment, these so-called "self-reliant developmental plans" have reached a dead end. Salt cyclones have damaged the products (fruit) that was supposed to be exported and endangered the people's health. If previously it was possible to dig a six metre-deep well to find water for agriculture, currently wells must be drilled to a depth of 120 metres. At the same time, the lake's now salty water is finding its way into the wells, often making them useless.
To protect the environment, a class solution is needed, not a national solution
In today's world, the protection of the environment is one of the most essential problems facing humanity. In fact, human existence itself is under threat. Any solution in the framework of the existing regime or any like it would only add to the problems.
A regime for whom the people have no value cannot be expected to respect nature.
The struggle to protect Lake Urmia has turned into a struggle against national oppression. Some see the deliberate killing of the lake as an expression of the Persian chauvinism that tramples Azari rights. It is true that the Islamic Republic allocates most of the budget to the central regions and holds back funding for the remote regions of oppressed nations. This is a clear expression of discrimination and national oppression. The main reason for the oppression of this region is that the Islamic Republic does not want to loosen its control over these regions. The regime knows that retreat on this issue means giving in to the demands of the Azari people. National oppression of minority peoples in Iran is one of the regime's main pillars, and it doesn't compromise on this.
Many Azari youth see this as a national (Azari) issue. Some people are trying to use the issue of protecting Lake Urmia to promote their own extreme and reactionary nationalism, such as pan-Turkism. Without drawing a dividing line with these political groups which are often connected to the regime in one way or another and/or the capitalist powers on a world scale, it is not possible to achieve a real solution. Within the narrow framework of "my land" and "my nation" it is not possible to resolve a problem that is the product of a global economic and social system. Protecting the environment is a country-wide and far more importantly global issue.
The only way to understand the real problem and the real solution is with an international horizon and a scientific outlook. So it is necessary to rupture from the common bourgeois thinking and to look for a real and serious solution.
It was the thinkers of the bourgeois system that for the first time talked about the domination of human beings over nature. They distorted the relationship between humans as part of nature and nature itself, in order to protect the interests and functioning of their system and alienate human beings from nature. Marx and Engels, the outstanding theoreticians of communist revolution, were among the first to criticize such views.
They emphasised that humanity itself is a part of nature. The permanent dependence of human beings on the natural environment they are part of limits humanity's ability to dominate nature. As Marx said ''Nature is man's inorganic body – that is to say, nature insofar as it is not the human body. Man lives from nature – i.e. nature is his body – and he must maintain a continuing dialogue with it if he is not to die. To say that man's physical and mental life is linked to nature simply means that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of nature.” (Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844). Nobody owns the land and other natural resources. Humanity is only its caretaker and must hand it over in better condition to the next generation. That is why Engels emphasized ''Let us not, however, flatter ourselves over much on account of our human victories over nature. For each such victory nature takes its revenge on us. Each victory... at every step we are reminded that we by no means rule over nature like a conqueror over a foreign people, like someone standing outside nature — but we, with flesh, blood and brain, belong to nature, and exist in its midst, and that all our mastery of it consists in the fact that we have the advantage over all other creatures of being able to learn its laws and apply them correctly.'' ( John Bellamy Foster, Marx's Ecology: Materialism and Nature).
Only the class that is suffering the most including the most from pollution can overcome the system that is based on profit and liberate the society.
The proletariat is the only class who can overcome the profit system. This class can liberate itself only by fully liberating all humanity and nature from the capitalist system.
Lake Urmia cannot be protected without revolution
It is possible to save Lake Urmia from collapse by taking urgent action, such as releasing the waters trapped behind the dams, preventing the digging of deep wells, banning the cultivation of crops around the lake such as sugar beets that need a lot of water. It is also possible to allocate funding and pay compensation to those whose lives and income have been seriously damaged. It is possible to mobilise the masses, and to combine the knowledge of experts and technology on a countrywide and international scale with the determination and will of the masses of people in Azerbaijan to find other solutions.
But under the Islamic Republic it is impossible to proceed in this manner. A regime that is deeply woven into the international profit system, one where corruption, robbery, suppression, crime and superstition and religion prevail, can do nothing to rescue the lake and save the environment and lives of the people. The Islamic Republic is resisting the people's demands because it is the guardian of the dominant economic and social structure in Iran and in particular Azerbaijan. The carrying out of even such simple measures would mean disrupting the functioning of the economic structure of the region, overturning the existing social relations and political power, and challenging the existing relations between the dominant and oppressed nations and the rich and poor. Effective measures to save the lake could only become possible by organising a revolution in social relations, a revolution whose aim is the interests of the people and nature. The first step of such revolution is the revolutionary overthrow of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
To change the relationship between humanity and nature, first of all there must be a change in the relationships among the people. Nature will face plunder and destruction until there is a just and free society whose aim is to eliminate all forms of oppression and exploitation. In today's world, the protection of the environment is a complex task. There are a variety of contradictions. But by reviewing all the positive and negative experiences of the past, including socialism in the Soviet Union and China in the days of Lenin, Stalin and Mao, humanity can make a decisive breakthrough.
The revolutionary communists are reviewing and learning from the past experiences of building socialism in China during the time of Mao and in Soviet Union during Lenin and Stalin. We are learning from the positive experience under Lenin's leadership when for the first time, in 1920 in the Soviet Union, a plan for the protection of natural regions was established, and the positive experience of socialist China when a special plan for reducing the harmful effects of industrial waste was organised, and also learning from the negative experience of over reliance on developing the productive forces in the Soviet Union during Stalin that led to over use of the natural resources.
There is also the reality of a short sided emphasis by the communists on the welfare of the people without regard to effects on nature and economic development. Consequently the development of the productive forces caused too much pressure on nature and natural forces and used up natural resources more than necessary. The scientific and critical summation of these experiences is part of new synthesis of the science of communism that is essential for leading a victorious revolution by the masses of people.
Once one of the dreams of the people of Azerbaijan was to transform Lake Urmia from a salt water body to a fresh water lake. A dream that could have turned into reality by controlling the salt of the Ahaar and Sabalan rivers (two rivers from north Azerbaijan that run into Lake Urmia. That dream will come true when the social relations among the people are transformed by communist revolution, a revolution that can combine a wise ecology and the liberation of humanity.
Mittwoch, 7. September 2011
New fractures in Iran's power structure
August 15 2011. A World to Win News Service. Further fissures and cracks have appeared among Iran's top rulers, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the spiritual leader of the Islamic regime, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his close circle in charge of the government.
Given the love affair between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad over the last six years and specially Khamenei's support for Ahmadinejad during the 2009 election that sparked an uprising, this difference between the two factions was not taken very seriously by masses at the beginning.
But now the sudden intensification of this row and the aggressive approach of both sides has left little doubt about the depth and gravity of the differences. These developments have also proved an explanation for previous contradictory statements made by Ahmadinejad and high-ranking conservative clergy.
This new round of quarrels broke out in April of this year when Ahmadinejad tried to fire Intelligence Minister Heydar Moslehi. This was strongly opposed by Khamenei, who reinstated Moslehi. In protest, Ahmadinejad did not turn up at his office for 11 days, until finally Khamenei threatened to dismiss him.
Upon his return Ahmadinejad faced a flood of criticism and threats from different sections of the power structure, especially his chief of staff Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, a former director of the Cultural Heritage and Tourism Foundation whom the pro-Khamenei forces are now attacking as the main figure behind what they call the "deviant current" formed by Ahmadinejad, Mashaei and their circle.
Some members of Parliament moved to impeach Ahmadinejad for defying parliamentary resolutions. He was accused of vote buying (at $80 a vote) during the 2009 election. In late May Parliament voted to investigate the matter.
The groups of thugs whom the dominant factions of the regime, including Ahmadinejad, had used to disrupt meetings and speeches of reformist and other opposition leaders, were assigned to abort the president's speech marking the anniversary of the death of the Islamic Republic's founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini on 4 June.
Since the rift has become public, around 30 people close to Mashaei and Ahmadinejad have been arrested. Among them are deputy foreign minister Mohammad Sharif Malekzadeh, Ahmadinejad associate Abbas Amirifar and journalists at the newspaper Hafte Sobh believed to belong to Mashaei.
Several Web sites close to Ahmadinejad and Mashaei were shut down. Although Ahmadinejad had to retreat in most cases, he persisted in trying to merge six ministries into three despite parliamentary opposition. Further, he issued a circular to the relevant ministries taking a stand against the proposed separation of women and men students into different classes in the universities and the early retirement of university lecturers that is meant to purge not considered politically and religiously correct, both measures supported by Khamenei.
Ahmadinejad is also trying to take control of the religious foundations known as the Oqaf organisations currently under the control of Khamenei's office. If he succeeded, this would mean that Khamenei would lose the control of very strong financial institutions with billions of dollars in annual income. Consequently, this will be a hard fight for Ahmadinejad and his gang.
These are not the only spheres of contention between Khamenei's supporters in the regime and Ahmadinejad's group. Despite the president's retreat, he continues to hit back here and there. One of the most important conflicts has involved the Pasdaran Corps (the so-called Revolutionary Guards), the Islamic Republic's strongest military force. Mohammad Ali Jaffari, the Pasdaran chief commander, said on 4 July, "The Pasdaran have been assigned by the judiciary system to deal with those who are currently related to the deviant current."
This was the Pasdaran’s clear support for Velayat-e Faqih (the religious doctrine of "Rule by the Supreme Jurist", the source of Khamenei's authority), and at the same time an open threat against the Ahmadinejad-Mashaei gang. Ahmadinejad hit back only a day later when he indirectly accused the Pasdaran of smuggling. Speaking at a conference against contraband goods and currency, he said "The 55-60 billion cigarettes consumed annually in Iran are worth 2 billion dollars. This figure would incite the greed of the world's biggest smugglers, so it would easily tempt our brothers who are smugglers." Jaffari's quick denial – "This kind of talk is a deviation" – left no doubt that Ahmadinejad had targeted the Pasdaran.
The row also involved the Oil Ministry. Ahmadinejad had fired this minister and taken charge of this key ministry himself. This was opposed by the Council of Guardians, a key body whose members are appointed by Khamenei, which called his move illegal. Ahmadinejad tried to ignore this ruling but finally had to retreat. He nominated another man to head the ministry, but failed to win parliamentary approval. Finally, after a month of negotiations, he named Pasdaran general Rostam Qasemi Oil Minister, and parliament gave its approval 3 August.
The nature and importance of the differences
Contention among different factions has been a permanent feature of the Islamic Republic of Iran since its foundation in 1979. With the election of Mohammad Khatami as president in 1997, the Islamic regime broke into two main factions, on the one side the conservative clerics and on the other those who wanted some reforms in the political system in order to save the Islamic Republic. This division defined the conflicts within the Iranian ruling class until recently.
Ahmadinejad has been aligned with Khamenei and other conservative sections of the regime against the reformists. His victory in the 2005 presidential race and especially his 2009 re-election were disputed by his opponents; many observers believe these victories would not have been possible without the support of Khamenei, the Pasdaran and the Basij militia led by the Pasdaran. It is claimed that those who engineered his victory in 2009 had to boost the 9 millions ballots cast for him to more than 23 million votes overnight. When Khamenei stepped in to express strong support for Ahmadinejad even before any formal decision, that ruled out any serious investigation of possible fraud.
Thus the present contention is unusual. Until recently these regime factions had to unite against the reformists and more importantly against the masses and their uprising. Khamenei helped Ahmadinejad achieve power in order to control him, but Ahmadinejad wants to be independent. He believes, or at least pretends to believe, that he owes his appointment not to Khamenei and the Pasdaran but the twelfth Imam. (Shia Islam holds that the twelfth and final successor to Mohammed, or Imam, known as the Mahdi or redeemer, did not die but is hidden; when the situation is ripe he will reappear to cleanse the world of corruption).
What has forced these two factions to continue to coexist, despite the harsh accusations against each other?
Khamenei probably could have impeached Ahmadinejad and eliminate him and his circle, but it would not be easy because there are many contradiction in his way. The Islamic regime has just gone through an uprising that strongly shook its pillars. The regime may have suppressed the uprising, but the people's retreat doesn’t mean a decisive defeat. A great many people are determined to find another opportunity to fight back. The participation of hundred thousands of people chanting anti-regime slogans in February demonstrations in Tehran and many other cities in support of the people’s movements in North Africa and the Middle East was a clear indication of that spirit. It is fair to say that the regime has come out of this battle not stronger but weaker. Thus Khamenei cannot risk recklessly destabilising the regime.
However there are other aspects to this. Every new conflict within the regime has cost it a part of its social base and core supporters. It would not be easy for many Khamenei supporters to digest a new split with a faction that until recently was a close ally. At the least, that would be dispiriting to its followers. This makes it especially hard for Khamenei to go ahead with impeaching Ahmadinejad. Many observers believe that Khamenei wants to keep Ahmadinejad until the end of his term, but under close control and supervision. It is also believed that the clergy will disqualify Ahmadinejad's candidates for parliament and especially the next presidential election in 2013. (Under law, he is not allowed to run for a third term.)
What makes this conflict different from the previous ones is that the two ruling gangs have lined up against each other in the ideological, political, economic and military spheres. Along with policy disputes, there is also conflict over the control of massive sources of income, such as oil and gas exports and the import and export of other commodities.
Ahmadinejad's efforts to keep key government posts exclusively in the hands of his circle was a source of conflict even during his first term as president. Mashaei has been another bone of contention. In 2008, when he was Iran's First Vice President, parliamentarians and conservative clergy forced him to resign for making allegedly pro-US and pro-Israeli remarks on several occasions. Among other things, he said that "It is the Israeli government that is our enemy and we have no enmity against the Israeli people." Ahmadinejad defiantly responded to this dismissal by making Mashaei his chief of staff.
Ideological differences
What makes Ahmadinejad's habit of removing clergy from governmental posts all the more irritating to Khamenei and his gang is the way the president has been distancing himself from the idea of Velayat-e faqih without explicitly admitting it. In fact the concept of the imminent reign of the Mahdi – which Mashei is accused of concocting – is in the service of such approach.
Ahmadinejad's fascination with the twelfth Imam is well known. His implication that he has the Madhi's backing is interpreted as trying to work around Khamenei's position as the Supreme Jurist and in fact make his existence meaningless. The clergy was outraged by a recent documentary claiming that the twelfth Imam will reappear soon. They blamed Mashaei and "deviant current" for this film. Ahmadinejad has repeatedly announced that he is answerable only to the twelfth Imam. This is laying the bases for the elimination of the clergy from the state apparatus.
Further, Mashaei and Ahmadinejad apparently believe that Islam has begun to lose its grip and are increasingly appealing Iranian nationalism instead. Mashaei has emphasised that Shia Islam (Iran's majority religion) represents the highest understanding of Islam and that Iran has added to Islam's richness. Ahmadinejad, in a speech at the National Museum of Iran, praised Cyrus the Great, the pre-Islamic founder of the Persian Empire, as one of the greatest moral leaders in human history. He continues to praise Iran and its past in his speeches and interviews. Such remarks have infuriated the conservative clergy. Even Mesbah Yazdi, the ayatollah Ahmadinejad claims to follow, called the idea of an "Iranian Islam" a shameful deviation.
Combining Islam with nationalism has caused some contention in the moral and cultural sphere as well. Ahmadinejad has repeatedly remarked that hijab (the covering of women's hair, a core issue in Islamic fundamentalism) "is not the most important problem of our society". He has argued in favour of permitting women into football stadiums, another extremely contentious question. Like his intervention against the proposed separation of women and men into different classrooms in the universities, this is a move to win over the reformists' social base. It also reflects an effort to "modernise" Islam, though lvery slightly.
The economic and military spheres
What makes this conflict all the more alarming for the ruling power structure is that these policy differences are being accompanied by economic and possibly military jockeying.
Ahmadinejad and his circle have been attempting to use their positions in government to build a financial base that could enable them to withstand the rival faction. Kayhan, a newspaper that strongly supports the most conservative clergy, including Ayatollah Khamenei, followed its remarks regarding the political differences by expressing deep concern about the economic measures sought by this faction. Kayhan says that the "deviant current" and Ahmadinejad "have crossed the line of justice by appointing unjustified persons to the government and also by making suspicious moves in relation to financial resources in the oil and industrial sectors (acts which, according to reports, have increased greatly in the last two years)."
Preparing for a possible conflict, Ahmadinejad has worked to reinforce relations with the Pasdaran both economically (by giving them massive construction contracts) and politically (by giving important governmental posts to Pasdaran commanders). His government has also enhanced the financial powers of provincial governors, who are appointed by the president. The struggle over the oil ministry is vital because petroleum is the country's most important source of income. But control over the import and export of other commodities is also an important issue.
Observers believe that Ahmadinejad and Mashaei have been trying to establish some sort of relations with the US, despite major obstacles on both sides. There are unconfirmed reports of several meetings between the Iranian government and US officials, including one between US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Mashaei in the United Arab Emirates. That would be consistent with Ahmadinejad's general efforts to gain room to manoeuvre. Voluntarily complying with World Bank and IMF conditions and further integrating Iran into the global economy would help the Ahmadinejad circle increase their role and influence in the economic structure and gain the upper hand politically. It is worth mentioning that imports of the most basic necessities for the masses have increased tremendously during the last six years of Ahmadinejad's presidency.
Ahmadinejad's proposal to shift control of the religious endowments from the Khamenei to the provincial governors can be considered another move in this direction.
The clear support of Pasdaran commanders for Ayatollah Khamenei and the row between Ahmadinejad and Pasdaran head Jaffari has led many people to believe that the Pasdaran are part of the Khamenei faction and Ahmadinejad cannot count on its support. But Ahmadinejad's contradictory and complex relationship with the Pasdaran and vice versa indicates that the situation is still highly fluid. At least it can be said that there are unclear and blind points in this relationship that need thorough investigation. For example, his naming of Pasdaran commander Rostam Qasemi to be Oil Minster, the presence of several ex-Pasdaran commanders in his cabinet and the many ex-Pasdaran occupying high governmental posts all seem to indicate some kind of trust between the two groupings. Perhaps events in the near future will shed light on this relationship.
Some sources of this conflict
Given the history of contradictions and contention within the Islamic Republic of Iran, it is hard to believe that such fissures and divisions will come to an end. As far as the recent rift is concerned, more than anything else it represents an ideological crisis. Islam has lost some of its ability to provide the regime with legitimacy and stability. People are tired of a theocratic regime and looking for a way out. Many of the regime's founders and the hard core of its managers, including the regime reformists, have pointed out the ineffectiveness of the Islamic Republic as it is and have called for reform. The 2009 uprising revealed a deep ideological crisis within the system. Recent developments, including the revolt in the Arab countries, have added to the worries of some factions of the regime.
In such a situation different factions want to put forward their programme to save the system, even if that means sacrificing and replacing some of the most important pillars holding up the regime. Ahmadinejad and Mashaei have understood that necessity and want to reform the regime in their way. But their success is not guaranteed, and they have to fight other factions, some operating openly and others not now taking a public position (for example, the Pasdaran).
What is certain is that even if Ahamdinejad and Mashaei were eliminated or silenced, these kinds of splits would not come to an end because the system itself is their source. They are all part of the problem.
But the destructiveness of the crisis will not itself lead to the overthrow of the Islamic regime, or at least will not automatically lead to its replacement with a system that is desired by the people. In fact, in any foreseeable situation, one or other faction will try to save the regime and restructure it more efficiently within the global imperialist system, and will continue to oppress, suppress and exploit the masses of people in the service of world capitalism.
At the same time these new developments also have the potential to push the people to tail one or another ruling class faction. The hatred for Ayatollah Khamenei, who has monopolised the key positions in the Islamic power structure and is the symbol of a theocratic system, could give rise to a pragmatic approach that would mean, this time, supporting the Ahmadinejad-Mashaei gang, even though they were key targets in the recent people's uprising. Such an approach would will take the people into a useless cycle and neutralise their years of struggle and sacrifices.
However, such fractures could weaken the system even more and provide the opportunity for the revolutionary forces to advance and organise their ranks and the masses for a radical change in the country.
Given the love affair between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad over the last six years and specially Khamenei's support for Ahmadinejad during the 2009 election that sparked an uprising, this difference between the two factions was not taken very seriously by masses at the beginning.
But now the sudden intensification of this row and the aggressive approach of both sides has left little doubt about the depth and gravity of the differences. These developments have also proved an explanation for previous contradictory statements made by Ahmadinejad and high-ranking conservative clergy.
This new round of quarrels broke out in April of this year when Ahmadinejad tried to fire Intelligence Minister Heydar Moslehi. This was strongly opposed by Khamenei, who reinstated Moslehi. In protest, Ahmadinejad did not turn up at his office for 11 days, until finally Khamenei threatened to dismiss him.
Upon his return Ahmadinejad faced a flood of criticism and threats from different sections of the power structure, especially his chief of staff Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, a former director of the Cultural Heritage and Tourism Foundation whom the pro-Khamenei forces are now attacking as the main figure behind what they call the "deviant current" formed by Ahmadinejad, Mashaei and their circle.
Some members of Parliament moved to impeach Ahmadinejad for defying parliamentary resolutions. He was accused of vote buying (at $80 a vote) during the 2009 election. In late May Parliament voted to investigate the matter.
The groups of thugs whom the dominant factions of the regime, including Ahmadinejad, had used to disrupt meetings and speeches of reformist and other opposition leaders, were assigned to abort the president's speech marking the anniversary of the death of the Islamic Republic's founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini on 4 June.
Since the rift has become public, around 30 people close to Mashaei and Ahmadinejad have been arrested. Among them are deputy foreign minister Mohammad Sharif Malekzadeh, Ahmadinejad associate Abbas Amirifar and journalists at the newspaper Hafte Sobh believed to belong to Mashaei.
Several Web sites close to Ahmadinejad and Mashaei were shut down. Although Ahmadinejad had to retreat in most cases, he persisted in trying to merge six ministries into three despite parliamentary opposition. Further, he issued a circular to the relevant ministries taking a stand against the proposed separation of women and men students into different classes in the universities and the early retirement of university lecturers that is meant to purge not considered politically and religiously correct, both measures supported by Khamenei.
Ahmadinejad is also trying to take control of the religious foundations known as the Oqaf organisations currently under the control of Khamenei's office. If he succeeded, this would mean that Khamenei would lose the control of very strong financial institutions with billions of dollars in annual income. Consequently, this will be a hard fight for Ahmadinejad and his gang.
These are not the only spheres of contention between Khamenei's supporters in the regime and Ahmadinejad's group. Despite the president's retreat, he continues to hit back here and there. One of the most important conflicts has involved the Pasdaran Corps (the so-called Revolutionary Guards), the Islamic Republic's strongest military force. Mohammad Ali Jaffari, the Pasdaran chief commander, said on 4 July, "The Pasdaran have been assigned by the judiciary system to deal with those who are currently related to the deviant current."
This was the Pasdaran’s clear support for Velayat-e Faqih (the religious doctrine of "Rule by the Supreme Jurist", the source of Khamenei's authority), and at the same time an open threat against the Ahmadinejad-Mashaei gang. Ahmadinejad hit back only a day later when he indirectly accused the Pasdaran of smuggling. Speaking at a conference against contraband goods and currency, he said "The 55-60 billion cigarettes consumed annually in Iran are worth 2 billion dollars. This figure would incite the greed of the world's biggest smugglers, so it would easily tempt our brothers who are smugglers." Jaffari's quick denial – "This kind of talk is a deviation" – left no doubt that Ahmadinejad had targeted the Pasdaran.
The row also involved the Oil Ministry. Ahmadinejad had fired this minister and taken charge of this key ministry himself. This was opposed by the Council of Guardians, a key body whose members are appointed by Khamenei, which called his move illegal. Ahmadinejad tried to ignore this ruling but finally had to retreat. He nominated another man to head the ministry, but failed to win parliamentary approval. Finally, after a month of negotiations, he named Pasdaran general Rostam Qasemi Oil Minister, and parliament gave its approval 3 August.
The nature and importance of the differences
Contention among different factions has been a permanent feature of the Islamic Republic of Iran since its foundation in 1979. With the election of Mohammad Khatami as president in 1997, the Islamic regime broke into two main factions, on the one side the conservative clerics and on the other those who wanted some reforms in the political system in order to save the Islamic Republic. This division defined the conflicts within the Iranian ruling class until recently.
Ahmadinejad has been aligned with Khamenei and other conservative sections of the regime against the reformists. His victory in the 2005 presidential race and especially his 2009 re-election were disputed by his opponents; many observers believe these victories would not have been possible without the support of Khamenei, the Pasdaran and the Basij militia led by the Pasdaran. It is claimed that those who engineered his victory in 2009 had to boost the 9 millions ballots cast for him to more than 23 million votes overnight. When Khamenei stepped in to express strong support for Ahmadinejad even before any formal decision, that ruled out any serious investigation of possible fraud.
Thus the present contention is unusual. Until recently these regime factions had to unite against the reformists and more importantly against the masses and their uprising. Khamenei helped Ahmadinejad achieve power in order to control him, but Ahmadinejad wants to be independent. He believes, or at least pretends to believe, that he owes his appointment not to Khamenei and the Pasdaran but the twelfth Imam. (Shia Islam holds that the twelfth and final successor to Mohammed, or Imam, known as the Mahdi or redeemer, did not die but is hidden; when the situation is ripe he will reappear to cleanse the world of corruption).
What has forced these two factions to continue to coexist, despite the harsh accusations against each other?
Khamenei probably could have impeached Ahmadinejad and eliminate him and his circle, but it would not be easy because there are many contradiction in his way. The Islamic regime has just gone through an uprising that strongly shook its pillars. The regime may have suppressed the uprising, but the people's retreat doesn’t mean a decisive defeat. A great many people are determined to find another opportunity to fight back. The participation of hundred thousands of people chanting anti-regime slogans in February demonstrations in Tehran and many other cities in support of the people’s movements in North Africa and the Middle East was a clear indication of that spirit. It is fair to say that the regime has come out of this battle not stronger but weaker. Thus Khamenei cannot risk recklessly destabilising the regime.
However there are other aspects to this. Every new conflict within the regime has cost it a part of its social base and core supporters. It would not be easy for many Khamenei supporters to digest a new split with a faction that until recently was a close ally. At the least, that would be dispiriting to its followers. This makes it especially hard for Khamenei to go ahead with impeaching Ahmadinejad. Many observers believe that Khamenei wants to keep Ahmadinejad until the end of his term, but under close control and supervision. It is also believed that the clergy will disqualify Ahmadinejad's candidates for parliament and especially the next presidential election in 2013. (Under law, he is not allowed to run for a third term.)
What makes this conflict different from the previous ones is that the two ruling gangs have lined up against each other in the ideological, political, economic and military spheres. Along with policy disputes, there is also conflict over the control of massive sources of income, such as oil and gas exports and the import and export of other commodities.
Ahmadinejad's efforts to keep key government posts exclusively in the hands of his circle was a source of conflict even during his first term as president. Mashaei has been another bone of contention. In 2008, when he was Iran's First Vice President, parliamentarians and conservative clergy forced him to resign for making allegedly pro-US and pro-Israeli remarks on several occasions. Among other things, he said that "It is the Israeli government that is our enemy and we have no enmity against the Israeli people." Ahmadinejad defiantly responded to this dismissal by making Mashaei his chief of staff.
Ideological differences
What makes Ahmadinejad's habit of removing clergy from governmental posts all the more irritating to Khamenei and his gang is the way the president has been distancing himself from the idea of Velayat-e faqih without explicitly admitting it. In fact the concept of the imminent reign of the Mahdi – which Mashei is accused of concocting – is in the service of such approach.
Ahmadinejad's fascination with the twelfth Imam is well known. His implication that he has the Madhi's backing is interpreted as trying to work around Khamenei's position as the Supreme Jurist and in fact make his existence meaningless. The clergy was outraged by a recent documentary claiming that the twelfth Imam will reappear soon. They blamed Mashaei and "deviant current" for this film. Ahmadinejad has repeatedly announced that he is answerable only to the twelfth Imam. This is laying the bases for the elimination of the clergy from the state apparatus.
Further, Mashaei and Ahmadinejad apparently believe that Islam has begun to lose its grip and are increasingly appealing Iranian nationalism instead. Mashaei has emphasised that Shia Islam (Iran's majority religion) represents the highest understanding of Islam and that Iran has added to Islam's richness. Ahmadinejad, in a speech at the National Museum of Iran, praised Cyrus the Great, the pre-Islamic founder of the Persian Empire, as one of the greatest moral leaders in human history. He continues to praise Iran and its past in his speeches and interviews. Such remarks have infuriated the conservative clergy. Even Mesbah Yazdi, the ayatollah Ahmadinejad claims to follow, called the idea of an "Iranian Islam" a shameful deviation.
Combining Islam with nationalism has caused some contention in the moral and cultural sphere as well. Ahmadinejad has repeatedly remarked that hijab (the covering of women's hair, a core issue in Islamic fundamentalism) "is not the most important problem of our society". He has argued in favour of permitting women into football stadiums, another extremely contentious question. Like his intervention against the proposed separation of women and men into different classrooms in the universities, this is a move to win over the reformists' social base. It also reflects an effort to "modernise" Islam, though lvery slightly.
The economic and military spheres
What makes this conflict all the more alarming for the ruling power structure is that these policy differences are being accompanied by economic and possibly military jockeying.
Ahmadinejad and his circle have been attempting to use their positions in government to build a financial base that could enable them to withstand the rival faction. Kayhan, a newspaper that strongly supports the most conservative clergy, including Ayatollah Khamenei, followed its remarks regarding the political differences by expressing deep concern about the economic measures sought by this faction. Kayhan says that the "deviant current" and Ahmadinejad "have crossed the line of justice by appointing unjustified persons to the government and also by making suspicious moves in relation to financial resources in the oil and industrial sectors (acts which, according to reports, have increased greatly in the last two years)."
Preparing for a possible conflict, Ahmadinejad has worked to reinforce relations with the Pasdaran both economically (by giving them massive construction contracts) and politically (by giving important governmental posts to Pasdaran commanders). His government has also enhanced the financial powers of provincial governors, who are appointed by the president. The struggle over the oil ministry is vital because petroleum is the country's most important source of income. But control over the import and export of other commodities is also an important issue.
Observers believe that Ahmadinejad and Mashaei have been trying to establish some sort of relations with the US, despite major obstacles on both sides. There are unconfirmed reports of several meetings between the Iranian government and US officials, including one between US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Mashaei in the United Arab Emirates. That would be consistent with Ahmadinejad's general efforts to gain room to manoeuvre. Voluntarily complying with World Bank and IMF conditions and further integrating Iran into the global economy would help the Ahmadinejad circle increase their role and influence in the economic structure and gain the upper hand politically. It is worth mentioning that imports of the most basic necessities for the masses have increased tremendously during the last six years of Ahmadinejad's presidency.
Ahmadinejad's proposal to shift control of the religious endowments from the Khamenei to the provincial governors can be considered another move in this direction.
The clear support of Pasdaran commanders for Ayatollah Khamenei and the row between Ahmadinejad and Pasdaran head Jaffari has led many people to believe that the Pasdaran are part of the Khamenei faction and Ahmadinejad cannot count on its support. But Ahmadinejad's contradictory and complex relationship with the Pasdaran and vice versa indicates that the situation is still highly fluid. At least it can be said that there are unclear and blind points in this relationship that need thorough investigation. For example, his naming of Pasdaran commander Rostam Qasemi to be Oil Minster, the presence of several ex-Pasdaran commanders in his cabinet and the many ex-Pasdaran occupying high governmental posts all seem to indicate some kind of trust between the two groupings. Perhaps events in the near future will shed light on this relationship.
Some sources of this conflict
Given the history of contradictions and contention within the Islamic Republic of Iran, it is hard to believe that such fissures and divisions will come to an end. As far as the recent rift is concerned, more than anything else it represents an ideological crisis. Islam has lost some of its ability to provide the regime with legitimacy and stability. People are tired of a theocratic regime and looking for a way out. Many of the regime's founders and the hard core of its managers, including the regime reformists, have pointed out the ineffectiveness of the Islamic Republic as it is and have called for reform. The 2009 uprising revealed a deep ideological crisis within the system. Recent developments, including the revolt in the Arab countries, have added to the worries of some factions of the regime.
In such a situation different factions want to put forward their programme to save the system, even if that means sacrificing and replacing some of the most important pillars holding up the regime. Ahmadinejad and Mashaei have understood that necessity and want to reform the regime in their way. But their success is not guaranteed, and they have to fight other factions, some operating openly and others not now taking a public position (for example, the Pasdaran).
What is certain is that even if Ahamdinejad and Mashaei were eliminated or silenced, these kinds of splits would not come to an end because the system itself is their source. They are all part of the problem.
But the destructiveness of the crisis will not itself lead to the overthrow of the Islamic regime, or at least will not automatically lead to its replacement with a system that is desired by the people. In fact, in any foreseeable situation, one or other faction will try to save the regime and restructure it more efficiently within the global imperialist system, and will continue to oppress, suppress and exploit the masses of people in the service of world capitalism.
At the same time these new developments also have the potential to push the people to tail one or another ruling class faction. The hatred for Ayatollah Khamenei, who has monopolised the key positions in the Islamic power structure and is the symbol of a theocratic system, could give rise to a pragmatic approach that would mean, this time, supporting the Ahmadinejad-Mashaei gang, even though they were key targets in the recent people's uprising. Such an approach would will take the people into a useless cycle and neutralise their years of struggle and sacrifices.
However, such fractures could weaken the system even more and provide the opportunity for the revolutionary forces to advance and organise their ranks and the masses for a radical change in the country.
Mittwoch, 21. Juli 2010
Death by stoning for Iranian women: the essence of the Islamic Republic
19 July 2010. A World to Win News Service. The news that Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani was about to be executed by stoning stunned and outraged millions of people everywhere.
The 43 year-old widow, a mother of two, was arrested by the Iranian Islamic regime in the northern city of Tabriz in 2005. She was convicted of an "illicit relationship" in May 2006 and received 99 lashes with a whip. Later the authorities opened another investigation against her for the murder of her husband, but in the end she was found guilty of "adultery" instead and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of the Islamic Republic upheld the verdict. The death sentence for adultery in Islamic Republic is usually carried out by stoning.
In the face of international disgust the Islamic regime had to back down. On 12 July the country's judiciary chief announced that her execution "will not be carried out for the moment." If she is not killed by stoning, this does not reduce the threat of her being executed by other means, such as hanging.
Execution, imprisonment and other kinds of naked suppression have always been mainstays of the Islamic regime, but now particularly after the people’s uprising they are becoming even more central to its rule. According to Amnesty International, last year nearly 390 people were executed in Iran and so far this year there have been 126 executions. Many of the dead were political prisoners. These numbers do not include people shot dead during the protests, such as Neda Agha Soltan, Sohrab Araabi and Kianoush Asa, or those murdered under torture such as Mohsen Rouholamini and others.
As the June anniversary of the uprising approached, the Islamic regime started another wave of executions to terrify the protesting people. The execution of five political prisoners in Tehran on 10 May was part a series that is still continuing. Hundreds of women, students, workers' leaders and activists have been arrested and tortured in prisons. The prevailing undeclared martial law left little room for the people to continue their protest. The 9th of July, traditionally a day of student protests over the last decade, saw another wave of repression in Tehran , especially in the universities. This time, most leaders and many activists were already in prison.
In addition, women, who have played a major role in the protests and fighting, have been a specific target of this campaign. The Islamic regime recently launched a "social protection" campaign focused on the dress and behaviour of women. The insistence on stoning Sakineh and other women and the execution of other women prisoners such as Zeinab Jalalian is part of this general reign of terror.
Even according to the Islamic regime, a death sentence requires serious evidence and the unanimous agreement of all the judges ruling in the case. According to her lawyer, Mohammed Mostafaei, neither of these conditions were met in her trial. No evidence was presented, and only three of the five judges found her guilty. But for the Islamic regime, when a poor woman is being tried, that is more than enough. Sakineh's son Sajad, 22, and her daughter, Farideh, 17, say their mother was unjustly accused and already punished for something she did not do. "She's innocent, she's been there for five years for doing nothing." (Guardian, 2 July 2010)
But the most important point is not her "guilt" or "innocence" of "illicit" relations. The whole concept of female "chastity" is a pillar of the subjugation of women. The stoning to death of women for "adultery" (or the mere suspicion that they may have had any kind of relationship whatsoever with men not their husbands or family members) is part of the same package as the compulsory wearing of the hejab (head scarf).
The Islamic regime forged its ideological identity by imposing laws and rules on women, aimed at keeping them subordinate to men as lesser beings living lives restricted by their gender. It has always reserved its most cruel repression for women, especially those who defy these reactionary laws and the system as a whole. The theocratic state considers any action by a woman not under the control of her masters a threat to the whole social order and the patriarchal and religious ideology that binds it together. This doctrine is a feature of all the major religions.
As a result of the public attention on the sentence against Sakineh and the activity of her children and her lawyer, other families have revealed that there are more women in prisons who have been convicted of adultery and sentenced to death by stoning. Two names, Azar Bagheri, 19, and Mariam Ghorbanzadeh, 25, have already been revealed. And certainly there are more.
Some other reports also indicate some more people are threatened by the unjust and brutal Islamic regime's execution machine. For example, Gholam-reza Hadadi is one of those awaiting execution, even though he was arrested when he was only 15. So is Zeinab Jalalian, a woman accused of belonging to a Kurdish opposition group. These sentences are a continuation of the Islamic regime's efforts to create an atmosphere of terror and in this way prolong its shameful rule.
The 8 March Women’s Organisation (Iran-Afghanistan) has put out a call to "act immediately to prevent the execution of Zeinab and Sakineh and hundreds of political prisoners. The lives of hundreds are in danger. We should be able to stop the killings of every single one of them by organizing our protests." (zan_dem_iran@ hotmail.com, www.8mars.com)
The 43 year-old widow, a mother of two, was arrested by the Iranian Islamic regime in the northern city of Tabriz in 2005. She was convicted of an "illicit relationship" in May 2006 and received 99 lashes with a whip. Later the authorities opened another investigation against her for the murder of her husband, but in the end she was found guilty of "adultery" instead and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of the Islamic Republic upheld the verdict. The death sentence for adultery in Islamic Republic is usually carried out by stoning.
In the face of international disgust the Islamic regime had to back down. On 12 July the country's judiciary chief announced that her execution "will not be carried out for the moment." If she is not killed by stoning, this does not reduce the threat of her being executed by other means, such as hanging.
Execution, imprisonment and other kinds of naked suppression have always been mainstays of the Islamic regime, but now particularly after the people’s uprising they are becoming even more central to its rule. According to Amnesty International, last year nearly 390 people were executed in Iran and so far this year there have been 126 executions. Many of the dead were political prisoners. These numbers do not include people shot dead during the protests, such as Neda Agha Soltan, Sohrab Araabi and Kianoush Asa, or those murdered under torture such as Mohsen Rouholamini and others.
As the June anniversary of the uprising approached, the Islamic regime started another wave of executions to terrify the protesting people. The execution of five political prisoners in Tehran on 10 May was part a series that is still continuing. Hundreds of women, students, workers' leaders and activists have been arrested and tortured in prisons. The prevailing undeclared martial law left little room for the people to continue their protest. The 9th of July, traditionally a day of student protests over the last decade, saw another wave of repression in Tehran , especially in the universities. This time, most leaders and many activists were already in prison.
In addition, women, who have played a major role in the protests and fighting, have been a specific target of this campaign. The Islamic regime recently launched a "social protection" campaign focused on the dress and behaviour of women. The insistence on stoning Sakineh and other women and the execution of other women prisoners such as Zeinab Jalalian is part of this general reign of terror.
Even according to the Islamic regime, a death sentence requires serious evidence and the unanimous agreement of all the judges ruling in the case. According to her lawyer, Mohammed Mostafaei, neither of these conditions were met in her trial. No evidence was presented, and only three of the five judges found her guilty. But for the Islamic regime, when a poor woman is being tried, that is more than enough. Sakineh's son Sajad, 22, and her daughter, Farideh, 17, say their mother was unjustly accused and already punished for something she did not do. "She's innocent, she's been there for five years for doing nothing." (Guardian, 2 July 2010)
But the most important point is not her "guilt" or "innocence" of "illicit" relations. The whole concept of female "chastity" is a pillar of the subjugation of women. The stoning to death of women for "adultery" (or the mere suspicion that they may have had any kind of relationship whatsoever with men not their husbands or family members) is part of the same package as the compulsory wearing of the hejab (head scarf).
The Islamic regime forged its ideological identity by imposing laws and rules on women, aimed at keeping them subordinate to men as lesser beings living lives restricted by their gender. It has always reserved its most cruel repression for women, especially those who defy these reactionary laws and the system as a whole. The theocratic state considers any action by a woman not under the control of her masters a threat to the whole social order and the patriarchal and religious ideology that binds it together. This doctrine is a feature of all the major religions.
As a result of the public attention on the sentence against Sakineh and the activity of her children and her lawyer, other families have revealed that there are more women in prisons who have been convicted of adultery and sentenced to death by stoning. Two names, Azar Bagheri, 19, and Mariam Ghorbanzadeh, 25, have already been revealed. And certainly there are more.
Some other reports also indicate some more people are threatened by the unjust and brutal Islamic regime's execution machine. For example, Gholam-reza Hadadi is one of those awaiting execution, even though he was arrested when he was only 15. So is Zeinab Jalalian, a woman accused of belonging to a Kurdish opposition group. These sentences are a continuation of the Islamic regime's efforts to create an atmosphere of terror and in this way prolong its shameful rule.
The 8 March Women’s Organisation (Iran-Afghanistan) has put out a call to "act immediately to prevent the execution of Zeinab and Sakineh and hundreds of political prisoners. The lives of hundreds are in danger. We should be able to stop the killings of every single one of them by organizing our protests." (zan_dem_iran@ hotmail.com, www.8mars.com)
Montag, 11. Januar 2010
Folterdrohung gegen iranischen Studenten
Nachdem Majid Tavakkoli am 7. Dezember bei einer Demonstration an der Technischen Universität Amir Kabir in Teheran eine Rede gehalten hatte, wurde er beim Verlassen der Hochschule festgenommen. Die Demonstrationen fanden zum so genannten Studententag statt, der nach dem persischen Kalender am 16. Azar (7. Dezember) begangen wird. An diesem Tag wird im Iran des Todes dreier Studenten gedacht, die im Jahr 1953 von Sicherheitskräften erschossen worden waren.
Die Nachrichtenagentur Fars, die den Revolutionsgarden und der Justiz nahe steht, veröffentlichte am Tag darauf Fotos, auf denen Majid Tavakkoli in Frauenkleidung zu sehen war. Dazu schrieb sie, dass der Student die Frauenkleidung zum Zeitpunkt seiner Festnahme trug, um nicht erkannt zu werden. Auf studentischen und anderen Webseiten wurde diese Behauptung jedoch dementiert. Stattdessen vermutet man, dass er gezwungen wurde, die Frauenkleidung zu tragen, um ihn zu demütigen. Weiter hieß es, dass Majid Tavakkoli bei seiner Festnahme geschlagen wurde.
Bei den Demonstrationen, die am 7. Dezember in verschiedenen Städten im ganzen Land stattfanden, wurden zahlreiche Studierende und mehrere weitere TeilnehmerInnen festgenommen. Einige sind mittlerweile freigelassen worden, viele befinden sich jedoch nach wie vor in Haft. Genaue Angaben über die Anzahl der noch Inhaftierten sind nicht bekannt.
HINTERGRUNDINFORMATIONEN
Majid Tavakkoli ist Mitglied einer studentischen Vereinigung an der Technischen Universität Amir Kabir, wo er nach vorliegenden Informationen Schiffbau studiert. Bereits im Mai 2007 hatte man ihn zusammen mit drei weiteren Beteiligten in Verbindung mit der Veröffentlichung einer studentischen Schrift festgenommen, in der der Islam verunglimpft worden sein soll. Nach Aussagen anderer StudentInnen handelte es sich dabei jedoch um eine Fälschung. Majid Tavakkoli wurde gefoltert und wegen „Propaganda gegen das System“ und „Beleidigung des Religionsführers“ zu einer dreijährigen Haftstrafe verurteilt. Nachdem Majid Tavakkoli Rechstmittel eingelegt hatte, wurde die Haftzeit auf 30 Monate verkürzt. Im August 2008 kam Majid Tavakkoli frei und durfte sein Studium wieder aufnehmen.
Zusammen mit rund 20 weiteren Studierenden wurde Majid Tavakkoli im Februar 2009 erneut festgenommen, nachdem er an einer Gedenkfeier teilgenommen hatte, die zu Ehren von Mehdi Bazargan stattfand, dem ersten Ministerpräsidenten nach der Revolution vom Februar 1979. Die meisten Studierenden wurden kurz darauf wieder frei gelassen, Majid Tavakkoli und drei weitere Studenten blieben jedoch ohne ein Gerichtsverfahren weiter in Haft. Im Juni 2009 kamen sie schließlich auf Kaution frei. Weitere Urgent Actions zu Majid Tavakkoli: UA 113/07 und UA 70/09.
Zwei Tage vor seiner Festnahme schrieb Majid Tavakkoli in seinem letzten Eintrag auf seiner Seite bei Facebook:
„Nur noch zwei Tage [bis zur Demonstration am Montag]. Mehr als zehn anstrengende Tage war ich nun unterwegs und bin mehr als 100 Stunden gefahren; jetzt muss ich mich auf den Weg nach Teheran machen. Ich schaue in die Augen meiner Mutter, die voller Tränen sind, und sehe die ängstlichen Blicke meines Vaters; es ist allein der tiefe Wunsch nach Freiheit, der mir trotz aller Hindernisse Kraft und Ausdauer verleiht. Und so stelle ich mich erneut all den Gefahren und ich fühle mich geehrt und bin stolz darauf, zusammen mit meinen Freunden am 16. Azar [7. Dezember] Schulter an Schulter gegen die Tyrannei zu protestieren. Für die Freiheit.“
Am 16. Dezember sagte Ali, der Bruder von Majid Tavakkoli, in einem Gespräch mit der in Prag ansässigen Radiostation Farda, dass die Familie seit seiner Festnahme nichts von Majid Tavakkoli gehört habe und dass sein Anwalt bislang nichts herausfinden konnte.
Als Zeichen der Solidarität und um die Freilassung von Majid Tavakkoli zu fordern, haben viele Iraner Fotos von sich in Frauenkleidung gemacht, auf denen sie ihr Gesicht verdecken und Schilder mit der Aufschrift „Wir sind Majid“ hochhalten, und diese ins Internet gestellt. Siehe beispielsweise (nur für Mitglieder bei Facebook aufrufbar): http://www.facebook.com/event.php?eid=198929939029#/photo_search.php?oid=198929939029&view=all
Bei Demonstrationen stehen Studierende immer wieder an der Spitze. Die andauernden Proteste richten sich gegen das umstrittene Ergebnis der Präsidentschaftswahlen vom Juni 2009 und gegen die weit verbreiteten Menschenrechtsverletzungen, die im Zuge des von den Behörden auferlegten Demonstrationsverbots und des harten und gewalttätigen Durchgreifens gegen Protestierende begangen worden sind. Dutzende wurden von Sicherheitskräften, die mit exzessiver Gewalt vorgegangen sind, getötet, tausende Menschen wurden festgenommen, die meisten von ihnen rechtswidrig, und viele wurden gefoltert oder in anderer Weise misshandelt. Hunderte Demonstrierende haben kein faires Gerichtsverfahren erhalten, manche mussten Massenschauprozesse über sich ergehen lassen. Mehr als 80 Betroffene wurden zu Gefängnisstrafen verurteilt, mindestens fünf erhielten das Todesurteil.
EMPFOHLENE AKTIONEN: SCHREIBEN SIE BITTE E-MAILS ODER LUFTPOSTBRIEFE
Fordern Sie von den iranischen Behörden die sofortige und bedingungslose Freilassung von Majid Tavakkoli und allen anderen, die im Zuge der Demonstrationen am 7. Dezember 2009 festgenommen wurden. Sie werden nur wegen der friedlichen Ausübung ihrer Rechte auf Meinungs-, Vereinigungs- und Versammlungsfreiheit gefangen gehalten.
Äußern Sie sich besorgt darüber, dass Majid Tavakkoli ein Opfer des „Verschwindenlassens“ ist und fordern Sie die sofortige Bekanntgabe seines Aufenthaltsortes.
Drängen Sie bei den Behörden darauf, sicherzustellen, dass Majid Tavakkoli vor Folter und anderen Misshandlungen geschützt wird, dass ihm sofortiger und regelmäßiger Zugang zu einer anwaltlichen Vertretung seiner Wahl und eventuell notwendiger medizinischer Versorgung gewährt wird.
Fordern Sie eine umgehende und unparteiische Untersuchung der Vorwürfe, dass Majid Tavakkoli in der Haft geschlagen wurde.
APPELLE AN:
OBERSTE JUSTIZAUTORITÄT VON TEHERAN
Ali Reza Avaei
Karimkhan Zand Avenue
Sana'i Avenue, Corner of Ally 17, No 152
Tehran, IRAN (korrekte Anrede: Dear Mr Avaei)
E-Mail: avaei(at)Dadgostary-tehran.ir
OBERSTE JUSTIZAUTORITÄT
Ayatollah Sadeqh Larijani
Howzeh Riyasat-e Qoveh Qazaiyeh
(Office of the Head of the Judiciary)
Pasteur St., Vali Asr Ave., south of Serah-e Jomhouri
Tehran, 1316814737, IRAN
(korrekte Anrede: Your Excellency)
E-Mail: via website http://www.dadiran.ir/tabid/75/Default.aspx
Erste Textzeile mit rotem Sternchen: Ihr Vorname. Zweite Textzeile mit Sternchen: Ihr Nachname. Dritte Textzeile mit Sternchen: Ihre E-Mail-Adresse. Appelltext in die große Textbox darunter.
KOPIEN AN:
LEITER DER STAATLICHEN MENSCHENRECHTSBEHÖRDE
Mohammad Javad Larijani
Howzeh Riassat-e Ghoveh Ghazaiyeh
Pasteur St. Vali Asr. Ave., south of Serah-e Jomhuri Tehran 1316814737, IRAN
(korrekte Anrede: Dear Mr Larijani)
Fax: (00 98) 21 3390 4986
E-Mail: bia.judi@yahoo.com
(Betreff: FAO Mohammad Javad Larijani)
S.E. Herr Ebrahim Sheibany, ao. u. bev. Botschafter
Botschaft der Islamischen Republik Iran
Jaurèsgasse 9, A-1030 Wien
Fax: +43-1-713 57 33, +43-1-713 46 94
E-Mail: public(at)iranembassy-wien.at
Bitte schreiben Sie Ihre Appelle möglichst sofort. Schreiben Sie in gutem Persisch, Arabisch, Englisch oder auf Deutsch. Da Informationen in Urgent Actions schnell an Aktualität verlieren können, bitten wir Sie, nach dem 29. Januar 2010 keine Appelle mehr zu verschicken.
Textvorschlag:
(Der Textvorschlag ist nur als Anregung gedacht. Falls Ihre Fremdsprachenkenntnisse ausreichen, dann verfassen Sie das Appellschreiben bitte selbst! Je individueller die Briefe sind, desto besser!)
(Entsprechende Anrede),
I would like to bring to your attention the case of student leader MAJID TAVAKKOLI, who was arrested on 7 December after a demonstration. His whereabouts are unknown and he is at risk of torture or other ill-treatment. Amnesty International considers him to be a prisoner of conscience, held solely for the peaceful exercise of his right to freedom of expression, association and assembly.
I call on you to immediately and unconditionally release Majid Tavakkoli, and any others detained around the 7 December demonstrations who are held solely for the peaceful exercise of their rights to freedom of expression, association and assembly.
I am deeply concerned that Majid Tavakkoli has been subjected to enforced disappearance and urge you to disclose his whereabouts immediately. Please also ensure that he is protected from torture and other ill-treatment and that he is granted immediate and regular access to his family, a lawyer of his choice and any medical treatment he may require.
Additionally, I ask you to investigate promptly and impartially the reports that Majid Tavakkoli was beaten during his arrest.
I trust that you will give appropriate attention to this case.
Yours sincerely,
Die Nachrichtenagentur Fars, die den Revolutionsgarden und der Justiz nahe steht, veröffentlichte am Tag darauf Fotos, auf denen Majid Tavakkoli in Frauenkleidung zu sehen war. Dazu schrieb sie, dass der Student die Frauenkleidung zum Zeitpunkt seiner Festnahme trug, um nicht erkannt zu werden. Auf studentischen und anderen Webseiten wurde diese Behauptung jedoch dementiert. Stattdessen vermutet man, dass er gezwungen wurde, die Frauenkleidung zu tragen, um ihn zu demütigen. Weiter hieß es, dass Majid Tavakkoli bei seiner Festnahme geschlagen wurde.
Bei den Demonstrationen, die am 7. Dezember in verschiedenen Städten im ganzen Land stattfanden, wurden zahlreiche Studierende und mehrere weitere TeilnehmerInnen festgenommen. Einige sind mittlerweile freigelassen worden, viele befinden sich jedoch nach wie vor in Haft. Genaue Angaben über die Anzahl der noch Inhaftierten sind nicht bekannt.
HINTERGRUNDINFORMATIONEN
Majid Tavakkoli ist Mitglied einer studentischen Vereinigung an der Technischen Universität Amir Kabir, wo er nach vorliegenden Informationen Schiffbau studiert. Bereits im Mai 2007 hatte man ihn zusammen mit drei weiteren Beteiligten in Verbindung mit der Veröffentlichung einer studentischen Schrift festgenommen, in der der Islam verunglimpft worden sein soll. Nach Aussagen anderer StudentInnen handelte es sich dabei jedoch um eine Fälschung. Majid Tavakkoli wurde gefoltert und wegen „Propaganda gegen das System“ und „Beleidigung des Religionsführers“ zu einer dreijährigen Haftstrafe verurteilt. Nachdem Majid Tavakkoli Rechstmittel eingelegt hatte, wurde die Haftzeit auf 30 Monate verkürzt. Im August 2008 kam Majid Tavakkoli frei und durfte sein Studium wieder aufnehmen.
Zusammen mit rund 20 weiteren Studierenden wurde Majid Tavakkoli im Februar 2009 erneut festgenommen, nachdem er an einer Gedenkfeier teilgenommen hatte, die zu Ehren von Mehdi Bazargan stattfand, dem ersten Ministerpräsidenten nach der Revolution vom Februar 1979. Die meisten Studierenden wurden kurz darauf wieder frei gelassen, Majid Tavakkoli und drei weitere Studenten blieben jedoch ohne ein Gerichtsverfahren weiter in Haft. Im Juni 2009 kamen sie schließlich auf Kaution frei. Weitere Urgent Actions zu Majid Tavakkoli: UA 113/07 und UA 70/09.
Zwei Tage vor seiner Festnahme schrieb Majid Tavakkoli in seinem letzten Eintrag auf seiner Seite bei Facebook:
„Nur noch zwei Tage [bis zur Demonstration am Montag]. Mehr als zehn anstrengende Tage war ich nun unterwegs und bin mehr als 100 Stunden gefahren; jetzt muss ich mich auf den Weg nach Teheran machen. Ich schaue in die Augen meiner Mutter, die voller Tränen sind, und sehe die ängstlichen Blicke meines Vaters; es ist allein der tiefe Wunsch nach Freiheit, der mir trotz aller Hindernisse Kraft und Ausdauer verleiht. Und so stelle ich mich erneut all den Gefahren und ich fühle mich geehrt und bin stolz darauf, zusammen mit meinen Freunden am 16. Azar [7. Dezember] Schulter an Schulter gegen die Tyrannei zu protestieren. Für die Freiheit.“
Am 16. Dezember sagte Ali, der Bruder von Majid Tavakkoli, in einem Gespräch mit der in Prag ansässigen Radiostation Farda, dass die Familie seit seiner Festnahme nichts von Majid Tavakkoli gehört habe und dass sein Anwalt bislang nichts herausfinden konnte.
Als Zeichen der Solidarität und um die Freilassung von Majid Tavakkoli zu fordern, haben viele Iraner Fotos von sich in Frauenkleidung gemacht, auf denen sie ihr Gesicht verdecken und Schilder mit der Aufschrift „Wir sind Majid“ hochhalten, und diese ins Internet gestellt. Siehe beispielsweise (nur für Mitglieder bei Facebook aufrufbar): http://www.facebook.com/event.php?eid=198929939029#/photo_search.php?oid=198929939029&view=all
Bei Demonstrationen stehen Studierende immer wieder an der Spitze. Die andauernden Proteste richten sich gegen das umstrittene Ergebnis der Präsidentschaftswahlen vom Juni 2009 und gegen die weit verbreiteten Menschenrechtsverletzungen, die im Zuge des von den Behörden auferlegten Demonstrationsverbots und des harten und gewalttätigen Durchgreifens gegen Protestierende begangen worden sind. Dutzende wurden von Sicherheitskräften, die mit exzessiver Gewalt vorgegangen sind, getötet, tausende Menschen wurden festgenommen, die meisten von ihnen rechtswidrig, und viele wurden gefoltert oder in anderer Weise misshandelt. Hunderte Demonstrierende haben kein faires Gerichtsverfahren erhalten, manche mussten Massenschauprozesse über sich ergehen lassen. Mehr als 80 Betroffene wurden zu Gefängnisstrafen verurteilt, mindestens fünf erhielten das Todesurteil.
EMPFOHLENE AKTIONEN: SCHREIBEN SIE BITTE E-MAILS ODER LUFTPOSTBRIEFE
Fordern Sie von den iranischen Behörden die sofortige und bedingungslose Freilassung von Majid Tavakkoli und allen anderen, die im Zuge der Demonstrationen am 7. Dezember 2009 festgenommen wurden. Sie werden nur wegen der friedlichen Ausübung ihrer Rechte auf Meinungs-, Vereinigungs- und Versammlungsfreiheit gefangen gehalten.
Äußern Sie sich besorgt darüber, dass Majid Tavakkoli ein Opfer des „Verschwindenlassens“ ist und fordern Sie die sofortige Bekanntgabe seines Aufenthaltsortes.
Drängen Sie bei den Behörden darauf, sicherzustellen, dass Majid Tavakkoli vor Folter und anderen Misshandlungen geschützt wird, dass ihm sofortiger und regelmäßiger Zugang zu einer anwaltlichen Vertretung seiner Wahl und eventuell notwendiger medizinischer Versorgung gewährt wird.
Fordern Sie eine umgehende und unparteiische Untersuchung der Vorwürfe, dass Majid Tavakkoli in der Haft geschlagen wurde.
APPELLE AN:
OBERSTE JUSTIZAUTORITÄT VON TEHERAN
Ali Reza Avaei
Karimkhan Zand Avenue
Sana'i Avenue, Corner of Ally 17, No 152
Tehran, IRAN (korrekte Anrede: Dear Mr Avaei)
E-Mail: avaei(at)Dadgostary-tehran.ir
OBERSTE JUSTIZAUTORITÄT
Ayatollah Sadeqh Larijani
Howzeh Riyasat-e Qoveh Qazaiyeh
(Office of the Head of the Judiciary)
Pasteur St., Vali Asr Ave., south of Serah-e Jomhouri
Tehran, 1316814737, IRAN
(korrekte Anrede: Your Excellency)
E-Mail: via website http://www.dadiran.ir/tabid/75/Default.aspx
Erste Textzeile mit rotem Sternchen: Ihr Vorname. Zweite Textzeile mit Sternchen: Ihr Nachname. Dritte Textzeile mit Sternchen: Ihre E-Mail-Adresse. Appelltext in die große Textbox darunter.
KOPIEN AN:
LEITER DER STAATLICHEN MENSCHENRECHTSBEHÖRDE
Mohammad Javad Larijani
Howzeh Riassat-e Ghoveh Ghazaiyeh
Pasteur St. Vali Asr. Ave., south of Serah-e Jomhuri Tehran 1316814737, IRAN
(korrekte Anrede: Dear Mr Larijani)
Fax: (00 98) 21 3390 4986
E-Mail: bia.judi@yahoo.com
(Betreff: FAO Mohammad Javad Larijani)
S.E. Herr Ebrahim Sheibany, ao. u. bev. Botschafter
Botschaft der Islamischen Republik Iran
Jaurèsgasse 9, A-1030 Wien
Fax: +43-1-713 57 33, +43-1-713 46 94
E-Mail: public(at)iranembassy-wien.at
Bitte schreiben Sie Ihre Appelle möglichst sofort. Schreiben Sie in gutem Persisch, Arabisch, Englisch oder auf Deutsch. Da Informationen in Urgent Actions schnell an Aktualität verlieren können, bitten wir Sie, nach dem 29. Januar 2010 keine Appelle mehr zu verschicken.
Textvorschlag:
(Der Textvorschlag ist nur als Anregung gedacht. Falls Ihre Fremdsprachenkenntnisse ausreichen, dann verfassen Sie das Appellschreiben bitte selbst! Je individueller die Briefe sind, desto besser!)
(Entsprechende Anrede),
I would like to bring to your attention the case of student leader MAJID TAVAKKOLI, who was arrested on 7 December after a demonstration. His whereabouts are unknown and he is at risk of torture or other ill-treatment. Amnesty International considers him to be a prisoner of conscience, held solely for the peaceful exercise of his right to freedom of expression, association and assembly.
I call on you to immediately and unconditionally release Majid Tavakkoli, and any others detained around the 7 December demonstrations who are held solely for the peaceful exercise of their rights to freedom of expression, association and assembly.
I am deeply concerned that Majid Tavakkoli has been subjected to enforced disappearance and urge you to disclose his whereabouts immediately. Please also ensure that he is protected from torture and other ill-treatment and that he is granted immediate and regular access to his family, a lawyer of his choice and any medical treatment he may require.
Additionally, I ask you to investigate promptly and impartially the reports that Majid Tavakkoli was beaten during his arrest.
I trust that you will give appropriate attention to this case.
Yours sincerely,
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