U.S./Iran agreement: A big strategic move in response to shifting necessities on both sides

20 April 2015. A World to Win News Service. The following is an abridged version of the article "Neither poison nor antidote" that will appear in Haghighat, organ of the Communist Party of Iran (Marxist-Leninist-Maoist). The nuclear deal between the U.S. and other rapacious world powers (Russia, China, Britain, Germany and France) on one side, and Iran on the other, is an important event. Even if they do not reach any final agreement on the nuclear programme issues, it has opened a new chapter in relations between Iran and the U.S. after 36 years. The end of this chapter remains unwritten and the final results are not predictable, but it is crucial to understand that this deal does not change the nature of the Islamic Republic of Iran nor of the U.S. This deal and their new relations are not in the short and long term interests of the people of Iran and the Middle East, but will likely bring new horrors to the people of this region. The conditions leading to this strategic shift The media have been filled with details of this deal, but in their security policy publications the architects of this agreement say explicitly that these don't really matter. What matters is the deal itself. (See, for instance, Jeremy Shapiro, "Why the details of the Iran deal don't matter", http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/04/07-iran-deal-details-shapiro.) In fact, the most important part of this deal is the institutionalization of a process whose aim is to compel the Islamic Republic of Iran to enter into closer diplomatic, political and even, or especially, military relations with the U.S. (as is already the case, for instance, in Iraq and in some ways, Syria). This is primarily the result of a shift in the U.S.'s strategic approach towards the Islamic Republic. United States policy has changed from seeking to marginalize and isolate Iran with the aim of "regime change" to seeking to integrate Iran into the network of political structures that ensure U.S. dominance in the Middle East. The normalization of relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran is a crucial part of the new U.S. approach to the Middle East that some analysts call the "Obama Doctrine". President Barack Obama explained his "doctrine" in an interview by Thomas Friedman in The New York Time 5 April 2015: "I've been very clear that Iran will not get a nuclear weapon on my watch, and I think they should understand that we mean it. But I say that hoping that we can conclude this diplomatic arrangement – and that it ushers a new era in U.S.-Iranian relations – and, just as importantly, over time, a new era in Iranian relations with its neighbours." This policy has been developed in response to the conflicts and challenges the U.S. is facing in the world and especially the Middle East. The accelerating collapse and chaos in political structures in the Middle East, the spread of Daesh (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria and the resurgence of Al-Qaeda, the no longer unthinkable prospect of Daesh forces reaching Jordan's border with Israel, the possibility of civil war in Saudi Arabia, the developing influence of China and Russia in the Middle East and North Africa and, even more, globally – all these factors have forced the U.S. to attempt to reach some sort of working relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The influential columnist Roger Cohen wrote in The New York Times 6 April 2015, "President Obama, through his courageous persistence, has changed the strategic dynamic in the Middle East. As he reassures worried allies, especially Israel and Saudi Arabia, he has also signalled that the United States will pursue its national interest, even in the face of fierce criticism, where the logic of that interest is irrefutable. Blocking Iran's path to a bomb, avoiding another war with a Muslim country, and re-establishing diplomatic contact with a stable power hostile to the butchers of the Islamic State amounts to a compelling case for an America faced by a fragmenting Middle Eastern order." As Cohen says, part of what is tempting the U.S. to pull Iran into defending the structure of its dominance in the increasingly unstable Middle East is the Iranian regime's own relative stability, its success with political and social suppression and electoral deception, and the coherence of different groups inside Iran's government. In the Friedman interview, Obama makes it clear that the risk of states collapsing in the Middle East and with that, the loss of U.S. control, is what lies behind the need to adopt a new approach towards the Islamic Republic. He says, "At this point, the U.S.'s core interests in the region are not oil, are not territorial. ... Our interests in this sense are really just making sure that the region is working. And if it's working well, then we'll do fine. And that's going to be a big project, given what's taken place, but I think this [Iran framework deal] is at least one place to start." [What Obama means by "the region is working" is the preservation of the U.S.-dominated status quo.] Conflicts within the U.S. ruling class Western pro-imperialist analysts say this deal will face stronger challenges within the U.S. ruling class than from inside Iran's. The nuclear programme, in itself and its details, isn't the issue in these political conflicts. Opponents of the deal believe this strategic shift towards Iran will break up the regional power hierarchy. For instance, the previously cited Shapiro, a member of the U.S. State Department's policy planning staff, writes "This is a fight over what to do about Iran's challenge to U.S. leadership in the Middle East and the threat that Iranian geopolitical ambitions pose to U.S. allies, particularly Israel and Saudi Arabia. Proponents of the deal believe that the best way for the United States to deal with the Iranian regional challenge is to seek to integrate Iran into the regional order, even while remaining wary of its ambitions. A nuclear deal is an important first step in that regard, but its details matter little because the ultimate goal is to change Iranian intentions rather destroy Iranian capability." The controversy about relations with Iran within the U.S administration and between Obama and Congress is just the tip of the iceberg, raising larger issues such as the role the U.S will play in the Middle East and North Africa and the region's importance for U.S global hegemony. Shapiro writes, "For President Obama, the Iranian deal is not just the centrepiece of his nuclear non-proliferation efforts, but also of his effort to pull the United States back from its involvement in the wasteful internecine struggles of the region. He seeks to re-establish the United States as a balancer in the region, rather than as a direct participant in its endless civil wars. A balancer has no friends or enemies." [Actually, the U.S. has played the biggest role in stoking "internecine" struggles in Iraq, where it established and still supports a sectarian government; Syria, where it backed opposition to Assad in a way that helped turn an uprising into a religious civil war; the civil war it launched in Libya; backing Saudi sectarian massacres in Yemen, etc. This is the "balance" the U.S. has brought to the region.] Obama, in his interview, emphasises the primary importance, from the viewpoint of U.S. interests, of keeping Israel powerful, but he also says, "There has to be the ability for me to disagree with a policy on settlements, for example, without being viewed as... opposing Israel. There has to be a way for Prime Minister Netanyahu to disagree with me on policy without being viewed as anti-Democrat." But his views about Saudi Arabia are different. He reaffirms the U.S.'s commitment to Saudi Arabia but he also stresses that Saudi Arabia confronts "threats" that are more from the "inside" than "outside": "Populations that, in some cases, are alienated, youth that are underemployed, an ideology that is destructive and nihilistic, and in some cases, just a belief that there are no legitimate political outlets for grievances. And so part of our job is to work with these states and say, 'How can we build your defence capabilities against external threats, but also, how can we strengthen the body politic in these countries, so that Sunni youth feel that they've got something other than [the Islamic State, or ISIS] to choose from?" Here it is clear that one problem facing the U.S. is that some states that are almost entirely dependent on U.S.'s military and political support are inherently unstable. Obama is saying that the U.S. wants to make the rulers of those states deal with this dangerous situation so that they can become more reliable from the point of view of U.S. imperialism's needs. He warns his allied Arab rulers that they have built their palaces on shaky ground: "They have been making some changes that are more responsive to their people…[But] the biggest threats that they face may not be coming from Iran invading. It's going to be from dissatisfaction inside their own countries." How is the "Obama Doctrine" supposed to respond to this situation on a regional scale? Obama says that in return for U.S military aid, Arab countries "also need to increase their willingness to commit their ground troops to solving regional problems." Although never explicitly stated, Obama's implicit answer is to "make Middle Easterners fight Middle Eastern conflicts", just as in an earlier period the U.S. tried to "Vietnamize" its war there and pull back from waging full-scale ground warfare by having "Asians fight Asians". Part of this requires drawing Iran more deeply into the global imperialist economic system and encouraging more Iranian political and military involvement in regional wars. But this is not in contradiction with arming Saudi Arabia and backing the alliance the Saudis are trying to put together to intervene in Yemen and oppose Iran and its alliances. Obama says explicitly that in the face of Iran's destabilizing regional activities he will help other countries oppose Iranian interests militarily, while he uses diplomacy to the same ends. He argues that the combination of these two policies, diplomacy on the one hand and military backing for Arab countries against Iran on the other, can change Iran's behaviour to American advantage by making Iran more plaint to the U.S. But none of these calculations will necessarily work out the way the U.S. hopes. There is the very real danger that this policy will stoke the fires of reactionary wars in the Middle East even higher. Obama calculates that the U.S. can design a "low intensity" war between state and non-state actors in the region while the U.S. acts from a distance – and the skies. His opponents think, on the other hand, that this strategy could lead to putting aside former allies without being able to replace them with more stable allies. Obama's response to them is that the U.S.'s previous measures in the Middle East not only failed but worsened the situation for the U.S. A quarter century after the end of the "Cold War", the U.S. has not been able to make the Middle East a stable region under its hegemony. Instead, the U.S.'s power and global influence has been challenged and steadily weakened in the region. What is the reality? Over the last few decades each imperialist move has done nothing but expand the wars between reactionary states and Islamic reactionary forces, forcing the biggest displacement and exodus of populations and a degree of suffering unprecedented in this region and not often matched in human history. The "Obama Doctrine" is a big gamble even from the perspective of the interests of the U.S. imperialist ruling class. What it is considered a good thing for one reactionary power will be a bad thing for others. Therefore, there will be powerful forces in the region trying to vanquish this policy. The situation of the U.S. and its allies in the Middle East is part of a global picture: the U.S.'s economic and political power has been declining, newly rising powers like China and revived imperialist powers such as Russia are expanding their influence in all the regions once under U.S. hegemony, including the Middle East, and the U.S.'s European allies are demanding a greater share of the world. The necessities and challenges confronting the Islamic Republic of Iran The "nuclear agreement" is the Islamic Republic of Iran's first step toward normalized relations with the US. President Hassan Rouhani stresses that the preliminary agreement is the beginning of "interacting with the world" and his government's agenda is to establish stronger relations with both powers that Iran hasn't had relations with and even with those labelled enemies until now. Rouhani says, "Some think that we must either fight the world or surrender to world powers. We say it is neither of those, there is a third way. We can have cooperation with the world." (Cohen interview) These statements represent a new approach to global and regional issues based on a relative consensus within Iran's ruling class. Selecting Rouhani as president was itself the result of a three-way political interaction between a part of the "pragmatist" wing, the Hezb-e Kaargozaaraan-e Saazandegi ("Executives of Construction") faction which Rafsanjani represents; a faction of the "conservative" wing, Osul-Garâyân (Iranianian Principalists), represented by Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei; and Western countries. At issue in their conflicts has been how to defend the Islamic Republic against two challenges. The first is how to handle the majority of the masses of workers and peasants, women and oppressed minority nationalities their system oppresses. The second challenge is that the U.S. backs other states in the region that are in competition with Iran. To handle the first challenge, the main policy is social and security suppression, especially expressed in trampling women's rights, promoting religion and superstition, and political deception through elections and political manoeuvring. In this political game, they have sometimes used reformist groups and sometimes pushed these groups to the margins. In facing the second challenge, the core strategy of the "pragmatist" wing is to try to regain Iran's membership in the U.S.'s regional club. The core strategy of the "conservative" group is to continue the policy of making use of the cracks between the U.S., Russia and China. Karim Sadjadpour, a policy analyst at the Carnegie Endowment, says, "Rouhani aspires to be Iran’s Deng Xiaoping. Rouhani’s mantra is: Preserve the system, fast-forward the economy, open to the world. Rouhani does not aspire to be Iran's Gorbachev. His thing is adaptation, not transformation. He is of the system, hence his room for manoeuvre. Unlike Iran's hard-liners, he believes the preservation of Iran's theocracy is compatible with – perhaps dependent on – normalized relations with the rest of the world, including the United States." (Quoted by Cohen) Sanctions were an important lever to force the Islamic Republic to adopt such an approach, in combination with military threats, the cyber-sabotage of nuclear facilities, a vast espionage campaign against the Islamic Republic (revealed by Edward Snowden) and the assassination of Iranian scientists working on the nuclear programme.Yet ultimately, this new approach is a response to the power necessities of the Iranian regime, including the strengthening of its foundations, the same aims the Islamic Republic pursued with its attempt to achieve the capacity to build nuclear weapons. But the Islamic Republic's policies in the international arena have worsened its internal structural problems. The spread of poverty and hopelessness in the Middle East has allowed reactionary forces like ISIS to attract millions of people, including in poorer areas and oppressed regions in Iran. This terrifies Iran's ruling class. In fact, ISIS has become a serious threat for the rulers of both Iran and the U.S., and one of the main reasons they see the need to collaborate with one another. Rouhani said in a news conference in Tehran on 4 June last year, "All countries need to embark on joint efforts regarding terrorism… Any time the Americans start to take action against terrorist groups, we can consider that." "We can work with Americans to end the insurgency in the Middle East." The Wall Street Journal (6 November 2014) revealed that Obama had written a secret letter to Khamenei in which he "described a shared interest in fighting Islamic State militants in Iraq and Syria." This, of course, ignores the fact that the rapid growth and spread of ISIS is a direct outcome of U.S. actions in the Middle East. The totality of the situation has pushed Iran into re-joining the "international community", as the imperialist world order is politely known, to find a safe haven, and also to seeking the "privilege" of foreign investment in Iran to remedy the regime's economic situation. The conservative wing agrees to the nuclear deal to the extent that it facilitates the continuation of the regime and the imperialist powers recognize the regime as a legitimate authority in the region. Both sides, the conservative wing and pragmatist wing, have reached a general consensus that the nuclear agreement is a major step on that road. Obama has stated explicitly that "regime change" is not now on the U.S. agenda. Demagogic gestures and deceitful propaganda The Islamic Republic's new relationship with the U.S. is no more in the interests of the masses of people than the long-standing conflict between them. Any illusions about this issue would only help the Iranian ruling class confuse the masses, remove itself as a target of people's demands and strengthen the regime's foundations. It is evident that capitalist-imperialist economic institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank shape Iran's economy and determine its functioning and position in the world economy. But the imperialists also exert strong influence over the regime in the political sphere. The dependence of governments in the dominated countries on one or another great power is part of the structure of the imperialist world system. For example, at the Geneva conference where the imperialists discussed how to handle Iran, some great powers acted as guardians of the Islamic Republic, namely Russia and China, while others worked in the opposite position. These great powers compete among themselves for the control and conquest of territories. The conflicting economic and political interests of the great powers have given the Islamic Republic the opportunity to pose as more independent than they really are. The horrible plans behind the U.S.-Iran nuclear agreement will not bring peace but unlimited regional wars. They will not lead to anything but greater population displacement, poverty, social oppression and enslavement of women. The Saudi-led attack in Yemen began the day after the nuclear deal, and there is worse to come. At the same time, the fact that many ordinary Iranians celebrated the signing of the agreement shows both the distrust of the Islamic Republic that still endangers it and the power of dangerous illusions among the masses of people. There is only one way to oppose all the reactionaries' moves and plans in the Iran and the region: To launch a revolutionary movement to overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran under the leadership of a communist party. Only the creation and spreading of a revolutionary alternative among the various strata of the people around the country can begin to change this dangerous situation.